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ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST THE DISQUALIFICATION 
OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE DUE TO ACTUAL BIAS OR 
PREJUDICE OR AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS OR 
PREJUDICE. 
The State argues that ''counsel was not constitutionally 
ineffective for not moving to disqualify Judge Kay." See Brief of 
Appellee, p. 10. According to the State, "trial counsel did not 
perform deficiently for failing to make a futile motion." See id. 
at pp. 10-15. The State's argument is contrary to established law 
and therefore without merit. 
On remand, the following exchange occurred at the outset of 
the hearing on remand on March 4, 2 010, in which trial counsel 
raised one of the inaccuracies in the PSI: 
THE COURT: Okay. You still talking about the 
attitude orientation paragraph? 
MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell you, 
counsel, and I don't have any 
disrespect for you, but I can tell 
you that we've been through this. 
I've had Mr. Kucharski on a case 
before this case, and I've had more 
stories that I have heard that he 
has been rebutted by a bunch of 
other people that he's plead guilty 
to and then he comes back and gets 
a new attorney and then he 
basically says all the same old 
stories again. 
MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And so if you want to go through 
all these this way, I'm more than 
1 
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happy to do it, but I made my 
ruling on that. I'm required to 
make the finding. I made a finding 
and I'm not going to have things 
reargued. 
MS. GEORGE: And I understand that, your Honor. 
My concern is just then I'm put in 
a position as his current counsel 
where Mr. Kucharski wanted these 
issues addressed. If I don't 
address them then I too am --
THE COURT: I'm not faulting you for addressing 
them. I'm just telling you what's 
the history. 
MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: --of this case and previous cases. 
(R. 278:12:2-24 (emphasis added)).1 At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court stated the following: 
What I would say in response to what we have 
done today is all of these changes that you've 
made, even if you want to take out the attitude 
and orientation change, the problem with this case 
and the problem that I didn't go along with what 
the plea was, was because Mr. Kucharski had had a 
history with me. And that paragraph under 
investigator comment, the second paragraph, the 
first sentence, the defendant has established 
instances of repetitive criminal conduct and 
continued criminal behavior. 
And that was the issue that was critical. 
And it was the issue that he was going from 
company to company, doing similar types of crime, 
and basically thinking he could get away with i t . 
That more than anything else --it wasn't the dog 
license failure. It really wasn't anything about 
the -- other than the record that I had had with 
lA true and correct copy of the Sentence Review hearing 
transcript, R. 278, is attached as Addendum C to the Brief of 
Appellant. An additional copy of the hearing transcript is contained 
in the record at R. 275. 
2 
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him. And despite what the recommendation was by 
the county or the defendant was that he deserved 
to go to prison because of the continued behavior. 
Probation hadn't changed him in the past under 
supervised probation, and he continued to commit 
crimes. 
And so I'm stating as a matter of fact and 
law that all the inaccuracies that have been 
addressed here that I have agreed to and agreed to 
what Mr. Kucharski said would not and will not 
change the sentence that I gave him to go to zero 
to five years in prison. So I do not see any 
reason to revise the sentence because those things 
did not affect it. 
(R. 278:36-37 (emphasis added)). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, a trial judge "should 
recuse himself when his ximpartiality' might reasonably be 
questioned." State v. Neeley, 748 P. 2d 1091, 1094 (Utah) 
(emphasis added), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct. 2876 
(1988) (citing Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C) (1) (b) (1981)) ;2 
see also State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1837 (1990) (emphasizing that 
"[n]othing is more damaging to the public confidence in the legal 
system than the appearance of bias or prejudice on the part of the 
judge.") (emphasis added)); see also Dmitry Bam, Making 
Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2 011 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 943, 1000 (2011) (proposing implementation of 
2The State refused to address the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 
1220, 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988). Moreover, the State's brief contains no 
citation, whatsoever, to Neeley. 
3 
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systemic "appearance-based" procedural recusal rules and 
recommending that focus be on appearances of partiality). The 
Court further dictated that recusal based on this standard "should 
be given careful consideration by the trial judge." Neeley, 748 
P. 2d at 1094. In fact, u[i]t may require recusal in instances 
where no actual bias is shown." Id.; see also State v. West, 2001 
UT App 275, 34 P. 3d 234 (reiterating the Utah Supreme Court's 
determination that "actual bias need not be found to support 
disqualification" and that "'appearance of bias or prejudice is 
sufficient for disqualification'", noting that "'disqualification 
due to the appearance of bias or prejudice seems more amenable to 
prospective application.'") (quoting Madsen v. Prudential Fed. 
Sav. & Loam Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 544 n.5 (Utah 1988)). 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the instant case involves 
more than an attitude of the trial judge about the "subject 
matter" of the lawsuit. Cf. In re Young, 1999 UT 81, f 35, 984 
P.2d 997; State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, U 17, 253 P.3d 1082. 
Throughout the remand proceeding in the instant case, the trial 
judge demonstrated actual bias or prejudice against Defendant by 
various personal comments concerning Defendant. The trial judge's 
comments indicated "a strong personal bias or prejudice 
concerning" Defendant or "a strong personal bias involving an 
issue in" the case. Munguia, 2011 UT 5 at 1 17. Moreover, the 
4 
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trial judge's comments demonstrated a predetermined decision based 
on this strong personal bias or prejudice against Defendant. See 
Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a 
Judge's Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned, 14 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 55, 59-60 (2000).3 
Defendant's trial counsel - with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence - should have realized the bias or prejudice grounds 
upon which to request the disqualification of Judge Kay in the 
instant case. The failure to request disqualification constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel's failure fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
which is demonstrated by existing Utah case law concerning the 
standard for disqualification, including the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, and the personal 
comments of the trial judge demonstrating at least an appearance 
if not an actual bias or prejudice in this case. See Abramson, 
Appearance of Impropriety, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics at 66 
(promoting the premise for the standard that "the appearance of 
fairness is as important as fairness itself.") (citations 
omitted)). 
3A true and correct copy of Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of 
Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality Might Reasonably 
Be Questioned, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55 (2000) is attached to this 
Brief as Addendum A. 
5 
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Addressing reversible error based on a trial judge's failure 
to recuse, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
But, while we recommend the practice that a judge 
recuse himself where there is a colorable claim of 
bias or prejudice, absent a showing of actual bias 
or an abuse of discretion, failure to do so does 
not constitute reversible error as long as the 
requirements of [Utah R. Crim. P. 29] are met. 
Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094-95 (emphasis added); cf. Debra Lyn 
Bassett and Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 
97 Iowa L. Rev. 181 (2011) (identifying flaws with current 
approach to judicial recusal). The comments made by Judge Kay in 
the instant case demonstrate actual bias or prejudice against 
Defendant. If not actual bias or prejudice, the comments, at the 
very least, demonstrate the appearance of bias or prejudice. 
Contrary to the State's assertion that prejudice is not shown, 
Judge Kay's comments colored the entire remand proceeding by 
demonstrating a refusal to impartially consider both the 
corrections to the PSI and how they might lead to a different 
outcome at sentencing. See R. 278:37:6-11 (where trial judge, 
after making numerous corrections to the PSI, determined, as a 
matter of course, that the inaccuracies "would not and will not 
change the sentence that I gave him . . . . " ) . The comments of 
bias and prejudice in the instant case cast a shadow of suspicion 
on the trial judge's fairness and consideration given to the 
6 
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inaccuracies presented by Defendant to the court. See Haslam v. 
Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 20, 190 P.2d 520 (1948); see also Bam, 
Making Appearances Matter, 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 10 03 
(emphasizing that " [r] ecusal lies at the heart of our 
understanding of the role of the courts in a democracy. It is 
meant to ensure judicial independence and impartiality and to 
protect the legitimacy of the courts as well as the reputation of 
the judiciary"). 
Had trial counsel moved for disqualification, there is a 
reasonable likelihood, based on Judge Kay's comments, that a 
recusal would have occurred or that another judge would have been 
assigned to the case. However, because trial counsel failed to 
file such a motion, Defendant was precluded from even having the 
disqualification matter duly considered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
29(c) . 
The failure of trial counsel to move for disqualification 
does not constitute sound trial strategy. The judge's comments 
demonstrated actual or at least the appearance of bias or 
prejudice against Defendant -- and there was nothing detrimental 
to Defendant in moving for such a disqualification as dictated by 
the procedures in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Based on 
the actual bias or prejudice shown and the circumstances of this 
case, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a 
7 
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reasonable probability that the results of the sentence review 
would have been different. Inasmuch as both prongs of the 
Strickland4 test have been established, the proceeding is 
inherently unreliable and the result cannot stand. See Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and that set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court set 
aside Judge Kay's review of his sentence in the instant case and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
Court's decision concerning recusal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of November, 2011. 
ARNOLD t wteGINS, P.C. 
I 
Counsel for^Appellant '-J^ op i: 
4See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052 
(1984); Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
8 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A: Leslie W. Abramson, "Appearance of 
Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's 
Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 
14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55 (2000) 
10 
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Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When 
A Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably 
Be Questioned" 
LESLIE W. ABRAMSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Bar Association's Codes of Judicial Conduct* are the founda-
tion for judicial discipline and disqualification in American courts. Forty-nine of 
the states have adopted some form of the American Bar Association ("AB A") 
Codes. They apply to legal and quasi-legal proceedings, full-time and part-time 
judges, as well as to judicial discipline. One of the most frequently invoked 
standards in the Codes expresses a concern that a particular fact situation requires 
judicial disqualification, because the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.2 
The Codes of Judicial Conduct refer throughout to the appearance of 
impropriety.3 For disqualification4 or discipline as a remedy for the appearance of 
* Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. 
1. In 1924, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted thirty-four Canons of Judicial 
Ethicsy which were adopted verbatim or in an amended version by a majority of the states over the next fifty 
years. In 1972, an ABA Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct chaired by California Chief Justice 
Roger Traynor completed three years of work and persuaded the ABA House of Delegates to adopt higher and 
more explicit standards of judicial conduct. The House of Delegates adopted a revised Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct in 1990. 
2. Whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is also referred to as the appearance of 
partiality, the appearance of impropriety, or negative appearances. 
3. Canon 1 of the 1990 Code states that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice 
in our society," raising the issue of whether all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of disqualification. 
See Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 357 (Ala. 1984). Canon 2 of the 1990 Code states a broad judicial 
ethical duty to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities." Canon 4 of 
the 1972 Code is somewhat narrower when it proclaims that, subject to the proper performance of judicial 
duties, judges may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice if 
in doing so the judges do not cast doubt on their capacity to decide impartially any issue that may submitted to 
them. 
4. Although most courts use the terms disqualification and recusal interchangeably, one court has noted a 
distinction between the terms. 
When the facts of a case present possible bias on the part of a trial judge, or the appearance of bias, the 
party who sees that possible bias or appearance of bias has the duty of moving for recusal. It becomes 
the judge's responsibility to initiate the action of removing himself from the case . . . only when he is 
disqualified. Generally, the grounds for recusal are as well known to the parties as they are to the 
judge, but facts leading to disqualification are often known only to the judge. 
When disqualification is required, the duty is squarely placed upon the judge to disqualify himself. 
Consequently, the judge's failure to disqualify himself in a particular case, when required to do so by 
55 
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impropriety, Canon 3 sets forth a general standard of disqualification for any 
proceeding in which the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."5 
Currently, the meaning and application of the standard is left to the discretion6 of 
the trial judge, with little or no guidance from the Codes about the exercise of that 
discretion.. 
For almost three decades, America's state judges have applied the Code of 
Judicial Conduct to their own conduct as well as to their judicial colleagues. Too 
often, for lack of guiding principles, reviewing courts and judicial conduct 
organizations have not analyzed fully the relation between the judge's conduct 
and the appearance of partiality. It is time for the ABA and the states to review 
their Codes in order to: (1) add ethical duties not currently addressed, such as a 
black-letter judicial duty to disclose any known disqualifying circumstances to 
counsel and parties;7 (2) broaden existing duties like the judge's duty to inform 
himself or herself about personal and family financial holdings;8 and (3) consider 
new disqualifying conditions to reclassify general appearance of partiality 
situations as specific per se grounds for recusal.9 The ABA and the states are 
capable of providing additional guidance, whether in the form of new black-letter 
standards or as added commentary language offered as a relevant analytical tool. 
Part I of this Article examines the Codes' standards relating to the appearance 
of impropriety, the accompanying Code commentary," waiver of disqualifying 
situations, and a comparison with attorneys' ethics rules about the appearance 
issue. Part II looks at judicial approaches to the appearance of impropriety, 
including its rationale, judicial disclosure of possible grounds for the existence of 
a negative appearance, the presumption of impartiality and the reasonable person 
standard by which appearances are measured, and whether an ethical violation 
for negative appearances requires a remedy such as a new trial or is merely 
harmless error. 
Part III of the Article studies the state court case law in nine factual contexts 
where the appearance of impropriety is often raised. The first five situations 
the Canons, may subject the judge to an inquiry if a complaint is filed with the Judicial Inquiry 
Commission, whereas, the judge's ruling on a recusal motion is reviewable on a mandamus petition 
filed in the appropriate appellate court. 
Ex Parte Cotton, 638 So.2d 870, 871-72 (Ala. 1994). 
5. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3C(1) (1972). 
6. When the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify, the appellate standard of review is whether the trial 
judge's ruling constituted an abuse of that discretion. See, e.g., In re Margaret Susan P., 733 A.2d 38, 42 (Vt. 
1999); Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Conn. 1998); State v. Wood, 967 R2d 702, 
709 (Idaho 1998); Farren v. Commonwealth, 516 S.E.2d 253, 256 (Va. Ct. App. 1999); Kinard v. Kinard, 986 
S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). 
7. See infra notes 30-32 and 54 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
9. As discussed in Part III, the ABA recently approved such an addition regarding campaign contributors. See 
infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text. 
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consider the effect of judicial remarks, the types of cases judges can hear in light 
of prior associations, professional associations with lawyers, other judges and 
organizations, and charges of wrongdoing filed by or against the judge. The other 
four categories are more personal to the judge, including the judge's personal 
connection to a proceeding, family relationships, social and business relation-
ships, and campaign activity. Following each section, there is a discussion of 
standards and criteria that should be added to the ABA Codes and commentary to 
assist judges, lawyers, and lay members of judicial conduct organizations in 
evaluating judicial disqualification or discipline. 
I. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT STANDARDS 
A. CODE STANDARDS 
Both modern versions of the AB A's Model Code of Judicial Conduct impose a 
duty upon a judge to disqualify himself or herself "in a proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited 
to"10 a list of specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its 
appearance is presumed.11 Although most courts have construed the 1972 Code's 
"should disqualify" to signify a mandatory12 duty, disqualification under Canon 3 
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1990). Instead of the ABA Code's phrase "the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned," California substitutes the phrase "disqualification is required by 
law." CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3E (1999). Alabama adds the phrase "is required by law" to its Code 
language. ALA. CANON OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3C(1) (1999). Louisiana adds the phrase "in which 
disqualification is required by law or applicable Supreme Court rule" to its version of the Code. LA. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1999). In its commentary, Wisconsin refers to its statute mandating 
disqualification under enumerated circumstances. Wis. SUP. CT. R. 60.04, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60.04(4) 
cmt. (1999). 
Several states use the "might reasonably be questioned" standard to govern the participation of other court personnel 
as well as judicial conduct commission members. For involvement of court personnel in a proceeding, see, e.g., N.H. 
SUPREME CT. R. 46 Canon 3C(1) (1999) (law clerks); MASS. SUP. JUD. COURT R. 3:12 Canon 4<E) (1999) (clerk of 
court); PA. RULES OF SUP. Cr. § 65.10 (1999) (court staff); S.C. APP. CT. R. 506 Canon 3E (1999) (staff attorney or law 
clerk). For application of the standard to judicial conduct committee member participation in a matter, see, e.g., N.H. 
SUP. CT. R. 40(2)(f) (1999); LA. STATE JUDICIAL COMM'N R. XII (1999); MASS. RULES OF COMM'N ON JUD. CONDUCT R. 
12B (1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §257:1-1-5 (1999); PA. Cr. RULES ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE R. 5C(2) (1999); WASH. 
RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. COMM'N R. 3(e)(1) (1999). 
11. 
Although the specific standards cover most of the situations in which the disqualification issue will 
arise, the general standard should not be overlooked. Any conduct that would lead a reasonable 
[person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's "impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned" is a basis for the judge's disqualification. 
E. Wayne Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct, A.B.A. 60 (1973). 
The Codes of California and Louisiana contain no list of specific examples of disqualification. CAL. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3E (1999); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1999). 
12. See, e.g., James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399,404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); State v. Laughlin, 508 N.W.2d 545, 
547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Carlson, 833 P.2d 463,467 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). But see Mitchell v. Class, 
524 N.W.2d 860, 863 (S.D. 1994) ("should" not mandatory). 
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clearly became mandatory in the 1990 Code by substitution of the word "shall" 
for "should."13 As the Preamble to the 1990 Code attempts to explain: 
When the text uses "shall" or "shall not," it is intended to impose binding 
obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action. When 
"should" or "should not" is used, the text is intended as hortatory and as a 
statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a binding rule 
under which a judge may be disciplined.I4 
Although the 1990 Code fails to define any of the terms in the phrase "the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," a close reading focuses on 
the phrase "might reasonably." If dictionary definitions are indicative of how a 
word is to be understood, judges perhaps should be wary of rejecting a motion to 
disqualify for the appearance of partiality. When the dictionary meaning of 
"might" includes "expressing especially a shade of doubt or a lesser degree of 
possibility,"15 use of that term in the Code would seem to require "a judge to err 
on the side of caution by favoring recusal to remove any reasonable doubt as to 
his or her impartiality."16 
The use of the term "reasonably" suggests that the viewpoint for assessing the 
presence of an appearance of impropriety is not from the perspective of the judge 
whose continued control of the case is at issue. In part to promote public 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, states use a reasonable person 
standard to decide the existence of an appearance of impropriety.17 What purpose 
does the term "reasonably" serve? Does it operate to affect the care a judge 
exercises before deciding whether to preside in a case? In other words, if "might" 
suggests a cautious approach to remaining in a case when there is a concern about 
appearances, "reasonably" suggests that such caution should be used only if a 
reasonable person would conclude an appearance of impropriety was present. 
Thus, a judge who subjectively believes that there is no appearance problem 
nevertheless may be persuaded to recuse if the reasonable person would find an 
appearance. Conversely, an overly cautious judge who leans toward recusal 
13. Of the forty-nine states that have adopted some form of the ABA Code, most use the term "shall" to 
describe the judge's responsibility to disqualify: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
The following states use the term "should:" Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington. 
Michigan's standard simply states that "a judge 'is' disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a 
case." MCR 2.003(B). 
14. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990). 
15. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 859 (3d ed. 1997). 
16. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
17. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text. 
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whenever anyone raises an appearance problem may decide to remain in a case if 
a reasonable person could discover no appearance of impropriety.18 
What is the relation between the general standard of the appearance of 
partiality and the specific per se examples of disqualifying conditions where 
unfairness and bias are assumed? Is disqualification confined to the enumerated 
examples that follow the rule, so that a fact pattern not included in that 
"laundry-list" does not require disqualification? Because the language following 
the general rule mandates recusal "including but not limited to" the specific 
examples, state courts interpret and apply the appearance of partiality beyond the 
rule's explicit illustrations.19 A judge's "impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned," then, "regardless of the source or circumstances giving rise to the 
question of impartiality and even though the source and circumstances may be 
beyond the judge's volition or control."20 
The appearance of partiality thus functions as an inclusive "catch-all" 
provision available as the source for evaluating recusal in two situations: (1) 
when facts do not altogether match the language of the specific examples;21 or (2) 
when the situation obviously falls outside the specific scenarios. In either case, 
the general rule operates as a "fall-back" position for any judge or party 
considering judicial disqualification. In Voeltz v. John Morrell & Co.,22 the court 
identified the disqualifying appearance of impropriety alternative to actual bias as 
"the existence of circumstances that lead to the conclusion that an unacceptable 
risk of actual bias or prejudgment inhered in the proceeding."23 
Before finding an appearance of partiality, some courts require evidence of a 
judge's actual or potential bias.24 As noted, a consequence of the "including but 
not limited to" language of the ABA Model Codes is that the specific "laundry 
18. See State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Iowa 1994) ("there is as much obligation for a judge not to 
recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is"), quoting Hinman v. 
Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987). 
19. See, e.g., Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991) ("the designated instances prompting 
disqualification do not exhaust all situations in which a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); 
State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) ("judge's duty to disqualify is not 
confined to the factors listed . . . but is much broader"). 
20. Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. 1995). 
21. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 185 (Conn. 1996) ("record shows that the judge possessed an 
actual bias against the defendant or, at least, that there existed a reasonable question concerning his 
impartiality"). 
Cf. King v. State, 271 S.E.2d 630, 633 (Ga. 1980). In King, the court found that a district attorney-now-judge 
had served as a lawyer in the matter in violation of Canon 3C(l)(b). However, because the court found no actual 
bias, it held that the appearance of partiality sufficed for the judge's disqualification. Compare Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 (1974) (appearance of partiality standard is no broader than the specific sections that 
follow it in federal judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C, § 455). 
22. Voeltz v. John Morrell & Co., 564 N.W.2d 315 (S.D. 1997). 
23. /(/.at317. 
24. See, e.g., State v. Putnam, 675 A.2d 422,425 (Vt. 1996); State v. Dominguez, 914 R2d 141, 144 (Wash. 
Ct.App. 1996). 
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list" examples do not anticipate every possible factual situation in which a 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Given the relative ease of 
making an allegation of negative appearances, the need for proof is vital when the 
justification for recusal is the residual "might reasonably be questioned" 
language. Thus, allegations about the appearance of impropriety require that 
"each such case must be evaluated on its own facts."25 
B. CODE COMMENTARY 
In both modern Codes of Judicial Conduct, the ABA supplements its ethical 
principles with a commentary adopted by most26 states. Consistent with the 1990 
Code's Preamble, states view the commentary not as a statement of additional 
rules but instead as guidance to the interpretation of the Canons}1 The 
commentairy for Canon 3C(1) of the 1972 Code twice refers to the appearance of 
impropriety standard. It notes that: (1) "a judge formerly employed by a 
governmental agency . . . should disqualify himself in a proceeding if his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned;"28 and (2) "[t]he fact that a lawyer 
in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a lawyer-relative of the 
judge is affiliated . . . may require" the judge's disqualification if his impartiality 
thereby might reasonably be questioned.29 
In three paragraphs, the 1990 Code commentary for Canon 3E(1)30 attempts to 
explain the context for its use in more detail. In the first paragraph, the ABA states 
that the disqualification standard of "whenever the judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned" is relevant "regardless of whether any of the specific 
25. Joyner v. Commissioner of Correction, 7.40 A.2d 424, 428 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). 
26. The following states have not adopted either Code's commentary for the appearance of partiality 
disqualification standard: Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. 
27. See, e.g., PETA v. Bobby Berosini, 894 P.2d 337, 340 n.5 (Nev. 1995). To underscore the "guidance" 
function of the commentary, the Arizona Supreme Court cited as "illuminating" a portion of the 1972 Code's 
commentary, which at the time it had not formally adopted. State ex rel. Corbin v. Superior Court, 748 P.2d 
1184, 1185 (Ariz. 1987). 
28. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C cmt. (1972). Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have adopted this portion of the commentary substantially or 
verbatim. 
29. Id. This provision has been adopted substantially or verbatim by Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
30. The following states have adopted all or substantially all of the three paragraphs of the ABA's 1990 Code 
of Judicial Conduct: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
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rules . . . apply."31 As an example, the commentary states that a judge who is in 
the process of negotiating for employment with a law firm is disqualified from 
presiding in any matter in which the law firm appears, due to the appearance of 
partiality.32 If the ABA believes that disqualification is necessary in that context 
without regard to additional facts, it is curious that the ABA did not simply 
include this factual context in the list of specific instances requiring disqualifica-
tion, especially because the judge is subject to lawyer discipline for that same 
activity under the AB A's Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys.33 
The commentary's second paragraph notes that "[a] judge should disclose on 
the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might 
consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes 
that there is no real basis for disqualification."34 Aside from using the hortatory 
"should," what is the purpose of this communication from the judge to the parties 
and counsel? Assume that the judge indeed discloses information that he or she 
believes the participants "might" find to be germane. If counsel believes that the 
judge has offered insufficient factual information, can she effectively depose the 
judge by asking for particulars?33 Would the purpose of uncovering such detail be 
to convince the judge that there is a valid basis for disqualification due to the 
appearance of partiality? Even without questioning the judge, the disclosure 
31. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). 
32. Virginia is the only state adopting the 1990 Code's commentary that omitted the example provided by the 
ABA. VA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1999). 
See Voeltz v. John Morrell & Co., 564 N.W.2d 315, 319 (S.D. 1997) (administrative law judge should have 
disclosed negotiations for employment with one of the parties; denial of motion for remand made four days after 
adverse opinion was reversed). 
33. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12(b), as amended, states in part that "[a] lawyer shall not 
negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in 
which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, or 
arbitrator." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.12(b) (1999). Unlike the judicial ethical standard, 
Rule 1.12(b) does not provide for a waiver. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 9 Disciplinary 
Rule 9-101(A) states that a "lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which he 
has acted in a judicial capacity." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 Disciplinary Rule 
9-101(A)(1983). 
34. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). Disclosure is a necessary prerequisite to a 
waiver of disqualification. Even the commentary's aspirational call for disclosure in states adopting the 1990 
Code can facilitate development of a "culture" that mandates disclosure about any information that may be 
deemed relevant to disqualification issues. The culture of disclosure can be furthered in states adopting either 
version of the Code through issuance of advisory opinions from judicial conduct organizations that require 
disclosure. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
35. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994) (after trial, defendant's attorney wrote to the 
trial judge to verify information obtained after trial that the judge had been the victim of sexual abuse as a child; 
judge confirmed the information but stated that he had not thought about his own experience prior to defendant's 
trial; trial judge did recuse himself from defendant's postconviction proceeding); State v. Montini, 730 A.2d 76,., 
84 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (upholds trial court's denial of counsel's request to answer series of questions about 
judge's affiliations with child advocacy organizations, the judge's writings on child advocacy, and to ask 
reasonable questions raised by the judge's answers). Cf Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390 (N.H. 
1992) ("[n]either the client nor his attorney have [sic] any obligation to investigate the judge's impartiality"). 
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might convince the parties and counsel about the judge's candid approach to the 
circumstances and about the necessity for seeking the judge's disqualification.36 
Or, the disclosure may permit them to build a record by having their motion for 
disqualification denied, knowing that a judge who did not recuse sua sponte is 
unlikely to do so in response to a motion for recusal. 
The third paragraph of the commentary codifies the common law urule of 
necessity," which "may override the rule of disqualification."37 Even if a judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the commentary recognizes that a 
judge "might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary 
statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate 
judicial action."38 
C. REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION 
The states are split about whether disqualification for the appearance of 
partiality is waivable.39 From the public's perspective, permitting the parties to 
waive disqualification where a judge's impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned may be troubling. Instead of withdrawing from the case, each version of 
36. Nebraska elevated the second paragraph of the commentary into its Code. NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3E(3) (1999). 
Florida's commentary to Canon 3E adds the following to the second paragraph: "Neither the fact that the 
judge conveys this information nor the fact that a lawyer or party has previously filed a complaint against the 
judge with the Judicial Qualifications Commission automatically requires the judge to be disqualified, and the 
issue instead should be resolved on a case-by-case basis." FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) cmt. 
(1999). 
37. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). Of the Canon 3E commentary, California 
adopted only the third paragraph. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3E cmt (1999). 
State courts occasionally note the tension between two other fundamental judicial policies: a judge's duty to 
decide cases, sometimes known as the "duty to sit," and the necessity for the judge to be a neutral and impartial 
decision maker. The United States Constitution and Supreme Court precedent provide the foundation of the duty 
to sit. See U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1 (judicial power vested in a supreme court, and inferior courts established by 
the Congress); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 180 (1803) (it is the province and duty of "judicial 
department" under Constitution to decide cases; judge's oath to support Constitution requires judge to exercise 
judicial power and decide cases consistent with fundamental law). The duty to sit may compel consideration of 
"whether cases may be unfairly prejudiced or unduly delayed, or discontent may be created through unfounded 
charges of prejudice or unfairness made against the judge." Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 
459 S.E.2d 374, 385 (W.Va. 1995). The Code of Judicial Conduct's rules for disqualification suggest that the 
appearance of partiality outweighs the duty of a judge to sit and decide a particular case. Even a judge who is in 
fact impartial and willing to do his or her best to "weigh the scales of justice equally between contending 
parties" may have to recuse to satisfy the appearance of impartiality. Crowell v. May, 676 So.2d 941, 944 (Ala. 
Civ.App. 1996). 
38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). Only in the latter situation must the judge 
disclose on the record the basis for the disqualification; then the judge must "use reasonable efforts to transfer 
the matter to another judge as soon as practicable." 
39. Two years after adopting a Code of Judicial Conduct, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
amended its Code of Judicial Conduct in 1975 by explicitly disallowing a waiver of disqualification "under any 
circumstances." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, 69 F.R.D. 273, 279 (1975). Four years 
later, the federal Code was amended again to reinstate the possibility of waiver of an appearance of partiality. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3D (1999). See 150 ER.D. 307 (1992). 
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the Code allows the judge to disclose on the record certain bases for 
disqualification. Thereafter, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the 
judge, must all agree that the judge's recusal is unnecessary. 
The states disallowing waiver for the appearance of partiality either omit any 
reference to the possibility of waiver40 or are based upon the 1972 Code, which 
permits a written waiver only for specified family relationships and financial 
interests.41 The 1990 Code is far more permissive than the 1972 Code's cautious 
approach. It permits waiver as part of the record for all recusals, except for 
personal bias or prejudice.42 For a valid waiver, then, the judge must disclose the 
basis for disqualification,43 all parties44 and counsel must agree without any 
judicial influence, and that agreement must be in writing45 or on the record. 
40. The following states do not address the issue of waiver in their codes: California, Connecticut, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. 
41. 
Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3C(l)(c) or Canon 3C(l)(d) 
may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his 
disqualification. If, based upon such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's 
participation, all agree in writing that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his financial 
interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. The 
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D (1972). The states disallowing waiver, under the above or a 
comparable provision, for the appearance of partiality are Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Washington. 
42. 
Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E may disclose on the 
record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, 
out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis 
for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, 
without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is 
then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be 
incorporated in the record of the proceeding. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F (1990). The provision applies in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Alaska's waiver provision is broader than the ABA rule in that it prohibits waiver when the judge believes that he or 
she cannot be fair and impartial or when waiver is not permitted by statute (the grounds for which are cited in its 
commentary). On the other hand, even if the parties agree to waiver, the judge is not bound by their decision. The judge 
also may ask the parties about their position on waiver, and can tell them that their failure to act on the waiver will be 
construed either as a decision to waive or not to waive. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F( 1M4) (1999). 
43. See, e.g., Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Center, 536 N.W.2d 666, 676 n.3 (N.D. 1995) (with no 
prior disclosure there cannot be even implied remittal). 
44. See, e.g., Woods v. Durkin, 539 N.E.2d 920,922-23 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (oral waiver by attorneys only is 
insufficient). See also City of Prattville v. Joyner, 698 So.2d 122, 124 n.l (Ala. 1997) (when all parties did not 
sign a remittal of disqualification, trial judge transferred case to another judge). 
45. See, e.g., James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399, 405 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (oral waiver insufficient); Woods, 
539 N.E.2d at 922-23 (oral waiver by attorneys only is insufficient). 
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Presumably when the record shows no agreement, the judge does not know who 
refused to sign.46 
D. ATTORNEYS' ETHICS RULES COMPARED 
While judges must remain sensitive to appearances, current lawyers' ethics standards 
take a more skeptical view of the appearance of partiality. In the 1969 ABA Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, Canon Nine announces that a "lawyer 
should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.'*47 The ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983, address the problems of the term "appearance 
of impropriety" for dealing with conflict of interest issues. 
[S]ince "impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of impropriety" is 
question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of 
disqualification cannot be properly resolved . . . by the very general concept of 
appearance of impropriety. 
Despite the disrespect accorded to the "appearance of impropriety" in the Model 
Rules, several courts by decision48 or by rule49 have ignored the criticism and 
continue to recognize the concept. 
46. 
To assure that consideration of the question of remittal is made independently of the judge, a judge 
must not solicit, seek or hear comment on possible remittal or waiver of the disqualification unless the 
lawyers jointly propose remittal after consultation as provided in the rule. A party may act through 
counsel if counsel represents on the record that the party has been consulted and consents. As a 
practical matter, the judge may wish to have all parties and their lawyers sign the remittal agreement. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL COISTDUCT Canon 3F cmt. (1990). 
47. MODEL, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983). Two of Canon Nine's aspirational ethical 
considerations state that only responsible and proper conduct by attorneys promotes the public's confidence in the legal 
system and the legal profession and that every lawyer "owes a solemn duty . . . to strive to avoid not only professional 
impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY Canon 9 EC 9-2, 
9-6 (1983). Ethical Consideration 5-6 also mentions the appearance of impropriety with regard to the care that needs to 
be taken by an attorney when the client wants to name the lawyer as executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument. Canon 
9's Disciplinary Rule 9-101 is titled "Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety/' and the specific sections address 
not accepting private employment in a matter where the lawyer either already acted as judge or had substantial 
responsibility as a public employee, and not stating or implying the ability to influence improperly courts, legislatures, or 
public officials. 
48. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997). While acknowledging that the Model 
Rules reject the appearance of impropriety standard and that the standard is "vague and leads to uncertain 
results," the court stated: 
[The standard] nonetheless serves the useful function of stressing that disqualification properly may 
be imposed to protect the reasonable expectations of former and present clients. The impropriety 
standard also promotes the public's confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. For these 
reasons, courts still retain the appearance of impropriety standard as an independent basis of 
assessment. 
Id. at 468. The court also recognized that Kentucky's commentary "specifically rejects the 'appearance of 
impropriety' standard." 
49. • R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct states: 
(c) This rule shall not alter the effect of case law or ethics opinions to the effect that: 
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II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CODE INTERPRETATION 
A. RATIONALE FOR THE APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY 
Judicial discourse about the appearance of partiality often includes an 
explanation of the rationale for the standard. Even the United States Supreme 
Court occasionally has contributed to the discussion, primarily as a matter of 
constitutional due process. In re Murchison50 was a due process case in which the 
same judge who acted as a "one-judge grand jury" in bringing contempt charges 
also could preside over the contempt hearing. In reversing the judgments of 
conviction, the Court opined on the appearance created by the situation. 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of 
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of 
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To 
this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try 
cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined 
with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This 
Court has said, however, that "Every procedure which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, 
and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law." 
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias 
and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between 
contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way "justice 
must satisfy the appearance of justice."51 
Three decades later, the Court found a due process violation when an Alabama 
Supreme Court Justice cast the deciding vote in a case involving the same issue 
which he personally was litigating in a trial court.52 The Court made clear that it 
was unnecessary to decide whether in fact the judge was influenced. Instead, it 
was sufficient for a due process violation that his sitting in the appellate case 
(2) in certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual 
conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which an 
ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would conclude that the multiple 
representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of 
one of the clients. 
The President of the New Jersey State Bar Association, in an article calling for an elimination of the standard 
from the New Jersey rules, termed the "appearance of impropriety" standard "an archaic rule bottomed in 
vagueness and arbitrariness, which promotes 'rampant ad hocery' and defies rational definition." Cynthia M. 
Jacob, A Polemic Against R.RC 1.7(c): The "Appearance of Impropriety" Rule, N.J. LAW., June 1996. 
50. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
51. Id. at 136, quoting Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (due process violation when 
defendant is tried by judge who is paid only when there is conviction) and Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 
14 (1954) (judge who became personally embroiled with attorney during trial cannot sentence attorney for 
contempt). 
52. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). 
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would offer a possible temptation to the average "judge not to hold the balance 
nice, clear, and true."53 
Because the Congress in 1973 adopted a parallel54 code of conduct for federal 
judges,55 the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to interpret the federal 
statute. In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corporation,56 the trial judge 
claimed that he had forgotten about his position as a trustee of a university that 
had an interest in the litigation. Noting the legislative history of the statute, the 
Court stated that its purpose was "to promote public confidence in the integrity of 
the judicial process."57 The Court next cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's 
language upholding the importance of a recusal standard based upon the 
appearance of partiality. 
The goal of [the statute] is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would 
appear" to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of the facts that 
would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is 
created even though no actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall 
the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the 
judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. The judge's forgetfulness, however, is 
not the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid the appearance of 
partiality. Under [the statute], therefore, recusal is required even when a judge 
lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case if a 
reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge 
would have actual knowledge.58 
Permitting substitution of another judge was the most effective method to 
promote and maintain public confidence in the judicial system. 
State courts too have written about the justification for the appearance of 
partiality standard. The premise for the standard is that the appearance of fairness 
is as important as fairness itself.59 "The legal system will endure only so long as 
members of society continue to believe that our courts endeavor to provide 
53. Id. at 825 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,60 (1972)). 
54. The statute provides: "Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in 
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1999). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1999). 
56. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). 
57. Id. at 860. 
58. Id. at 860-61, quoting Health Services Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 R2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986). 
59. See, e.g., Ex parte Bryant, 682 So.2d 39,41 (Ala. 1996) ("appearance of fairness is virtually as important 
as is fairness itself*); Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 384 (W. Va. 1995) 
("avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important... as avoiding impropriety itself); McElhanon v. 
Hing, 728 P.2d 273,282 (Ariz. 1986) ("justice must not only be done fairly but. . . must be perceived as having 
been done fairly"); Wells v. Walter, 501 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1973) (appearance of impropriety is next in 
importance only to actual impropriety and cannot be sacrificed to convenience); Consiglio v. Consiglio, 711 
A.2d 765, 768 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) ("appearance and the existence of impartiality are both essential elements 
of a fair trial"). 
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untainted, unbiased forums in which justice may be found and done/' In order 
to maintain a high level of public respect for the judiciary, the courts themselves 
must conscientiously protect the right of every citizen to have the "cold neutrality 
of an impartial judge."61 
60. Tennant, 459 S.E.2d at 384. See Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 877-78 (N.D. 
1993) (public respect and confidence "can only be maintained if justice satisfies the appearance of justice"); 
State ex rel. Corbin v. Superior Court, 748 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Ariz. 1987) ("system of justice depends for its 
survival on the support and confidence of the public"); Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238, 247 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("vital to public confidence in the legal system that decisions of the court are not only fair, 
but also appear fair"); State v. Laughlin, 508 N.W.2d 545,548 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (give litigants "no cause to 
think their case is not being fairly judged"). 
61. Consligio v. Consligio, 711 A.2d 765, 768 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 
194 So. 613 (Fla. 1939). To guarantee every litigant less than an impartial judge: 
tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration of justice. It is not enough for a judge to 
assert that he is free from prejudice. His mien and the reflex from his courtroom speak louder than he 
can declaim on this po in t . . . . The attitude of the judge and the atmosphere of the courtroom should 
indeed be such that no matter what charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause he is called on to 
litigate, he can approach the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum where the judicial ermine is 
everything that it typifies, purity and justice. 
Id. at 768-69. 
Judicial independence may be another reason for state courts to apply an "appearance of partiality" rule in 
addition to the specific examples in the state codes. In Consiglio, a trial judge removed himself from all cases 
involving an attorney because the judge did not approve of the way the attorney handled himself. Despite the 
understanding between the judge and the attorney about the meaning of the earlier ruling, several weeks later the 
presiding judge for the jurisdiction assigned the trial judge to hear a case in which the attorney was counsel of 
record. Reversing the judgment, the appellate court held that it "was inappropriate for the presiding judge to 
instruct the trial judge to hear" the case. 
The presiding judge does not have the power to tell a trial judge when he or she may or may not recuse 
himself or herself. The matter of a judge's recusal in the reasonable discretion of that judge, and is not 
to be overruled by a presiding judge. The decision to recuse oneself is an intrinsic part of the 
independence of a judge. Any attempt to instruct or order a judge to hear a matter after recusal, 
violates the independence of judges individually and the judiciary as a whole. 
Id. at 769. 
Another expression of concern about judicial independence and appearances was in Rogers v. Bradley, 909 
S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1995). The plaintiffs in that medical malpractice case challenged four members of the Texas 
Supreme Court because their election had been supported by the Texas Medical Association Political Action 
Committee ("TEX-PAC"). One of the justices not then facing election recused himself because TEX-PAC had 
tied its political efforts to the outcome of Rogers and at some time had endorsed or challenged every sitting 
member of the court. That brought a stinging observation from one of the challenged justices: 
[RJecusal would be required even though there is no questionable conduct on the part of the judge, but 
solely because third parties tied their political efforts to the outcome of a particular case. While I 
consider such third party activities to be troublesome, and I fear growing acceptance of this type of 
campaigning bodes ill for the traditional notion of an independent judiciary, it cannot affect recusal. A 
reasonable person would know that campaign supporters have motives for their support. But a 
reasonable person cannot, without more, be justified in doubting the impartiality of the t r ibunal . . . . 
Under his reasoning, only judges who faced no election opposition would be able to fully perform the 
functions of their office. Judges who defeated well-financed election opposition with strong 
broad-based support would be virtually removed from the duties of the office to which they were 
elected. 
Id. at 883-84. 
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B. JUDICIAL DISCLOSURE TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL 
One peculiar aspect of both ABA Codes is the interplay between a judge's 
knowledge about family, social and professional relationships, as well as 
finances, and the duty to disclose to the parties any basis that may exist for 
disqualification. Under the Codes, a judge must keep informed only about 
personal and fiduciary finances and make a reasonable effort to stay apprised 
about the personal finances of the judge's spouse and minor children living with 
the judge.62 The ABA should modify the current standard to impose a mandatory 
duty on judges to stay informed at least about any of the specific disqualifying 
circumstances: 
(2) A judge should keep informed about any circumstance which could lead to 
disqualification, particularly the circumstances described in Canon 3E(l)(a)-(e) 
[or Canon 3C(l)(a)-(e)]. 
The reason for using the aspirational "should" in this standard is that, unlike the 
other standards, the judge's failure to inform himself or herself need not be the 
basis for reversible error or even an ethical violation. 
In states adopting the commentary to the 1990 Code, the judge "should" 
disclose on the record any information that the parties "might" consider relevant 
to disqualification issues, even if the judge believes that the information provides 
no cause for recusal.63 The paradox* is that although the judge "should" disclose 
any information that may be grounds for recusal, the judge has a duty to remain 
knowledgeable about limited types of information. The current commentary 
language regarding disclosure should be mandatory, be part of the black-letter 
ethical standards, and follow the 1990 Code's Canon 3E(2) statement about a 
judge's duty to remain informed: 
62. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(2) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3C(2) cmt. (1972). See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(c) (1990); MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l)(c) (1972) (relating to disqualifying situations for economic interests in the 
subject matter of a proceeding or a party to the proceeding). 
63. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). The 1972 Code is silent on the disclosure 
issue. One court has characterized this provision as "a separate obligation . . . that is broader than the duty to 
disqualify." In the Matter of Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 711 (Ind. 1998). See Inquiry Concerning Frank, 753 
So.2d 1228, 1240 (Fla. 2000) (appellate judge should have disclosed to opposing counsel that his daughter's 
divorce attorney was appearing as counsel in appellate case). 
However, in United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 106-07 
(1985), the appellate court used the trial judge's delay to support a judge who failed to disclose to the parties 
until thirty-two days into the bench trial that his spouse had worked for one of the parties when the claim arose. 
The objecting party seeking mandamus was unable to cite any judicial conduct by the judge that supported any 
inference of partiality. 
Even if disclosure if required, how much disclosure is necessary? Is the fact of disclosure or the nature of the 
disclosure more important? Disclosure may be inappropriate or unnecessary when it would result in the parties 
having information about a confidential proceeding involving the judge. 
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A judge shall disclose on the record any information which the judge believes the 
parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, 
even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification. 
Even if a judge does convey pertinent information to the parties, the judge is 
not automatically required to recuse when a motion is filed. The judge's 
disclosure simply gives the parties the opportunity either to request that the judge 
recuse or to agree in writing that the judge may nevertheless hear the dispute.6^ In 
Kalapp v. State,65 after the judge made a pretrial disclosure that in private 
practice he had represented the defendant's grandfather, he asked whether either 
party intended to file a motion to disqualify. Neither party sought recusal. At 
sentencing, the judge noted that in a small town he knows everyone, including 
both families in the instant case. The appellate court upheld his refusal to recuse 
himself sua sponte. 
When a judge fails to disclose information to the parties that the judge knew or 
should have known, this failure to disclose could provide the basis for a motion to 
disqualify. However, the case law is split on this issue. Some cases suggest that an 
appellate court should remand the case or vacate all orders entered by the judge who 
failed to disclose a basis for disqualification.66 Other courts have concluded that failure 
to make a timely disclosure either does not raise an appearance of partiality or renders 
an ethical violation effectively harmless.67 For example, in State v. Mann,68 although 
the trial judge did not disclose before a child kidnapping trial that he had been a victim 
of child abuse, the appellate court held that the judge's experiences were "so attenuated 
in time and so dissimilar in nature that no reasonable person... could conclude that the 
judge would be perceived as being disqualified."69 In Tennant v. Marion Health Care 
Foundation, Inc.,70 the appellate court set aside a successor trial judge's conclusion that 
the plaintiffs "had an absolute right to be notified" about the original trial judge's 
representation in his official capacity by one of the defense counsel and that appearance 
of impropriety required a new trial. While the appellate court agreed that the original 
64. See, e.g., Voeltz v. Morrell & Co., 564 N.W.2d 315, 319 (S.D. 1997) (no opportunity to waive 
disqualification); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 75 (Miss. 1996) (judge should have 
given parties an opportunity to object or consent to his sitting in case); Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455 
(Iowa 1996) (no opportunity to request judge's recusal); State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994) (no 
chance to make motion to disqualify or waive jury); Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390 (N.H. 
1992) (lost opportunity to motion for recusal or waive conflict). See also State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435,441 -43 
(Kan. 1996) (judge disclosed that stolen car in case belonged to his brother, but denied counsel's motion to 
disqualify; no error in denial of motion). 
65. Kalapp v. State, 729 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
66. See, e.g., Voeltz, 564 N.W.2d at 319 (reversal, in part because administrative law judge failed to disclose 
that she was negotiating with defendant for employment while case was pending); Bride 556 N.W.2d at 455 
(reversal, in part for failure to disclose judge's prior representation of defense counsel's law firm). 
67. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
68. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 1994). 
69. Id. at 533. 
70. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc, 459 S.E.2d 374,384 (W.Va. 1995). 
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trial judge had called the judicial process into question, it held that the appearance of 
impropriety or a "sense of unfairness" did not require a new trial, 
C. PRESUMPTION OF IMPARTIALITY AND THE 
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD 
In reviewing a motion to recuse, the challenged judge is presumed to be 
qualified and impartial, i.e., a "judge would not undertake to preside over a case 
where his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned."71 "The law will 
not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to 
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that 
presumption and idea."72 As a result of this presumption of honesty and integrity, 
a moving party has the burden of proving that the judge is unqualified, actually 
biased and prejudiced, or appears to be partial.73 To avoid the appearance of 
impropriety, the judge should be the first to raise the issue by recusing in a 
particular case. If a judge recuses sua sponte, appellate courts assume that a 
reasonable person would have doubts about the judge's impartiality, regardless of 
whether the reviewing court itself would have recused on the same facts.74 On the 
other hand, when a party seeks the trial judge's recusal for the appearance of 
partiality, appellate decisions are divided about whether the judge's personal 
views matter. Some decisions correctly conclude that the judge's subjective 
beliefs matter only when actual bias and prejudice are alleged,75 rather than when 
the record shows that a reasonable person would find an appearance of 
partiality.76 Other decisions exhibit more deference to the trial judge, assuming 
that he or she would have disqualified himself or herself if there had been any 
reasonable question concerning his or her impartiality.77 
71. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238,246 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). See Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 
1144,1151 (Miss. 1998) (defendant failed to overcome presumption that judge was qualified and unbiased). 
72. Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986), quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES. 
73. See, e.g,, Turner v. State, 926 S.W.2d 843,847 (Ark. 1995); Wallace v. State, 741 So.2d 938,941 (Miss. Ct. App. 
1999) (burden of proof on movant is beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Haskins, 573 N.W2d 39,44 (Iowa Ct. App, 
1997) (movant's burden is "substantial"); Brown v. State, 663 So.2d 1028,1031 (Ala Crim. App. 1995) (same). 
74. See Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 386 n.10 (W. Va. 1995); Jacobs v. 
Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416,417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997). 
75. However, the trial judge's assurances of no prejudice are worthless when the record fails to support the 
judge's finding of fact. See, e.g., Ellis v. Proctor and Gamble Dist, Co., 433 S.E.2d 856, 857 (S.C. 1993). See 
also Sincavage v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 224, 230 (1996) ("doubt as to impartiality . .. arises when 
judges changes her mind upon learning the very fact which she earlier said would disqualify her"); Perotti v. 
State, 806 P.2d 325, 328-29 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (judge's initial offer to recuse "uniquely significant" to 
finding appearance of partiality). 
76. State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 917-18 (Mo. 1996). See Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 823 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1994) ("we do not question in the least the judge's intentions . . . or his determination from a 
subjective, personal viewpoint that recusal was not necessary;" recusal deemed appropriate "to avoid public 
appearance of partiality"). 
77. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171,178 (Mo. 1998) (judge "is in the best position to decide whether 
recusal is necessary"); Linkage v. Trustees of Boston University, 679 N.E.2d 191,201 (Mass. 1997) ("judge also 
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The standard used by most78 state courts to measure whether a judge's 
impartiality might be questioned is objective79 rather than subjective. Several 
reasons support rejection of the judge's subjective perspective. 
Problematic is the fact that judges do not stand outside of the judicial system; 
they are intimately involved in the process of obtaining justice. Judges who are 
concluded that the case was not one in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); Lawson v. 
State, 664 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (whether a circumstance had "any impact upon the judge's 
impartiality . . . is a question only the trail judge can answer"). See also People v. T&C Design, Inc., 680 
N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (1998) ("if a Judge is passing upon a question of his or her own recusal, then he or she is 
creating an appearance of impropriety by that act alone"); Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: 
Who Judges the Judges?t2% VALP. L. REV. 543 (1994). 
78. Some courts have ruled that the existence of an appearance of partiality is "a subjective determination . . . only 
the trial judge can answer." Lawson, 664 N.E.2d at 781. The question for the Lawson court was whether the particular 
circumstance had any effect on the judge's impartiality. The court assumed, "absent any evidence to the contrary, that the 
trial judge would have disqualified herself had there been any reasonable question concerning her impartiality." Id 
Other courts also mistakenly view the judge's evaluation of the appearance of partiality as a two-step process. The 
judge first determines whether he or she has a subjective bias, and, if not, whether objectively his or her impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Class, 524 N.W.2d 860, 863 (S.D. 1994); State v. Connors, 995 
S.W.2d 146,149 (Term. Crim. App. 1998). Reliance on this analytical technique is misplaced. The case relied upon in 
Mitcfiell correctly applied the two-step approach to the presence or absence of personal bias or prejudice. State v. Smith, 
242 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1976). However, while a subjective component of a personal bias or prejudice analysis is proper, 
see, e.g., Parenteau v. Jacobson, 586 N.E.2d 15 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), it is inappropriate in assessing whether a judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 
79. Several state courts have cited excerpts from Judge Easterbrook's remarks from In Matter of Mason, 916 
F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990), about the dilemma posed by the availability of the objective "might reasonably be 
questioned" language for evaluating a judge's ethics. See, e.g., Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717 
A.2d 1232, 1237 (Conn. 1998); Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 882 (Tex. 1995); Robin Farms, Inc. v. 
Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
An objective standard is essential when the question is how things appear to the well-informed, 
thoughtful observer rather than to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person. Because some people 
see goblins behind every tree, a subjective approach would approximate automatic disqualification. A 
reasonable observer is unconcerned about trivial risks; there is always some risk, a probability 
exceeding 0.0001%, that a judge will disregard the merits. Trivial risks are endemic, and if they were 
enough to require disqualification we would have a system of peremptory strikes and judge-shopping, 
that itself would imperil the perceived ability of the judicial system to decide cases without regard to 
persons. A thoughtful observer understands that putting disqualification in the hands of a party, whose 
real fear may be that the judge will apply rather than disregard the law, could introduce a bias into 
adjudication. Thus the search is for a risk substantially out of the ordinary. 
An objective standard creates problems in implementation. Judges must imagine how a reasonable, 
well-informed observer of the judicial system would react. Yet the judge does not stand outside the 
system; as a dispenser rather than a recipient or observer of decisions, the judge understands how 
professional standards and the desire to preserve one's reputation often enforce the obligation to 
administer justice impartially, even when an observer might be suspicious. Judges asked to recuse 
themselves hesitate to impugn their own standards; judges sitting in review of others do not like to 
cast aspersions. Yet drawing all inferences favorable to the honesty and care of the judge whose 
conduct has been questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety standard under 
§455(a) into a demand for proof of actual impropriety. So although the court tries to make an external 
reference to the reasonable person, it is essential to hold in mind that these outside observers are less 
inclined to credit judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary itself will be. 
In Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d at 386 (emphasis in original). 
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asked to recuse themselves are reluctant to impugn their own standards. 
Likewise, judges sitting in review of others do riot like to cast aspersions. Yet 
drawing all inferences favorable to the honesty and care of the judge whose 
conduct has been questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety 
standard into a demand for proof of actual impropriety. Accordingly, we are 
mindful that an observer of our judicial system is less likely to credit judges' 
impartiality than the judiciary.80 
Assessing judicial impartiality from the subjective position of the moving party 
also is defective.81 The adversary seeking recusal is already questioning the 
judge's impartiality, and the opponent likely will oppose the motion by arguing 
that no such appearance is present. 
Instead of asking whether the judge personally doubts his or her own partiality, 
courts look at the facts and circumstances known to the judge or brought to the 
judge's attention: would a reasonable person knowing all the facts conclude that 
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned? When it is plausible for 
a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality, it is then appropriate for 
a party or counsel to challenge the judge's impartiality by motion. 
The 1972 ABA Code Reporter's standard for evaluating the appearance of 
impartiality was "any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all 
the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned."82 Despite that guidance, state courts have adopted numerous 
80. Tennamt v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc. 459 S.E.2d 374, 386 n-. 9 (W. Va. 1995), quoting United 
States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1995). 
Even a judge's statement that a person could reasonably question his impartiality may be ignored by an 
appellate court. See State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 533 n.l (Iowa 1994) (judge's response did not concede an 
ethical violation because judge stated in deposition that he gave his prior experiences as abuse victim no thought 
as he approached trial of child kidnapping). 
81. See State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 778, 784 (Kan. 1984) (neither the judge, the defendant, or his attorney 
should determine whether the judge's objectivity would be questioned); United Farm Workers of America, 
AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 106 n.6 (1985) ("the partisan litigant emotionally involved in 
the controversy underlying the lawsuit is not the disinterested objective observer whose doubts concerning the 
judge's impartiality provide the governing standard"). 
82. E. Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct, A.B.A. 60-61 (1973). Connecticut and Ohio 
have adopted this standard. See Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Conn.1998); 
James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399,404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
Other states use Thode's standard in similar language. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 974 P.2d 11, 20 (Haw. 1999) 
("assessment of a reasonable impartial onlooker apprised of all the facts"); Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 
455 (Iowa 1996) ("whether a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality"); In re Edwards, 694 
N.E.2d 701, 710 (Ind. 1998) ("whether an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would 
have a reasonable basis for doubting"); In re Cooks, 694 So.2d 892, 903 (La. 1997) ("any reasonable judge, 
faced with such circumstances, would have recused"); Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1152 (Miss. 1998) 
("whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts"); State v. Jones, 979 
S.W.2d 171, 178 (Mo. 1999) ("whether a reasonable person would have a factual basis to find an appearance of 
impropriety and thereby doubt the impartiality of the court."); Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 
238, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("existence of an appearance of impropriety . . . is based on the perception of a 
member of the general public, not one trained in the law"); Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390 
(N.H. 1992) ("would a reasonable person, not the judge himself, question the impartiality of the court"). In 
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variations. The reasonable person is sometimes characterized as a "reasonable 
disinterested observer,"83 a person of reasonable or ordinary prudence,84 a 
"reasonably prudent and disinterested person,"85 or a "well-informed, thoughtful 
and objective observer."86 Some decisions require that the reasonable person 
know all the facts in the public domain,87 or know the relevant facts and 
understand them.88 Despite the differences in defining the reasonable person 
standard, the states' uniform approach toward the general principle mitigates the 
need to include it in the ABA Code, 
D. JUDICIAL REMEDY OR HARMLESS ERROR FOR ETHICAL VIOLATIONS 
After deciding that an appearance of partiality violation has occurred, the court 
must determine whether a remedy is proper or whether to apply a harmless error 
analysis.89 If the appearance of partiality provides the only basis for reversal, one 
set of cases suggests vacating all orders entered by the now-disqualified judge as 
Kentucky, the judicial reference is to "an objective observer." Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 
882 (Ky. 1992). 
83. Ball v. Melsur Corporation, 633 A.2d 705, 709 (Vt. 1993). 
84. Goines v. State, 708 So.2d 656,659 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810,823 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1994); Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986). 
85. State v. Carlson, 833 P.2d 463,468 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis supplied). 
86. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc. 459 S.E.2d 374, 386 (W. Va. 1995), quoting United 
States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995). 
87. Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 881 (Tex. 1995) 
88. See State v. Putnam, 675 A?2d 422,425 (Vt. 1996); Chapman v. State, 694 A.2d 480,483 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1997). 
89. Complaints of ethical violations also can arise in the context of a judicial disciplinary proceeding. 
Typically, a case is heard by the state's highest court when a judicial conduct entity recommends a disciplinary 
sanction after finding an ethical violation. In re Cooks, 694 So.2d 892 (La. 1997), concerned a judge who was 
charged with failing to recuse when her own attorney was also representing a party in a case pending before the 
judge, and she had a close personal relationship with another litigant. After finding that the appearance of bias 
and prejudice were "overwhelming," the Louisiana Supreme Court enumerated a list of relevant factors for an 
appropriate sanction: 
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, 
extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in 
or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in his 
private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether 
the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his conduct; (g) the length of service on the 
bench; (h) whether there have been prior complaints about this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has 
upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which the judge exploited his 
position to satisfy his personal desires. 
In re Cooks, 694 So.2d at 904. The court found that the aggravating factors were that: (1) the misconduct 
occurred in the judge's official capacity; (2) it had detrimentally affected respect for the judiciary; and (3) it 
created the appearance that she used her position to help obtain a favorable ruling for her friend. Mitigating 
factors identified by the court were that this was an isolated instance of a failure to recuse, the judge stipulated 
that the conduct occurred, she had been a judge for only a short time, and that she had received no prior 
disciplinary sanctions. Id. at n.16. Of the possible sanctions of removal, suspension, public censure, and private 
reprimand, the court concluded that public censure, as recommended by the Judiciary Commission, was proper. 
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well as any subsequent orders that were based upon the earlier, "tainted" 
rulings.90 
A second group of cases incorrectly upholds denial of a disqualification motion 
when the jury is the fact finder and actually decides the case, because the 
"integrity of the fact-finding process is insulated from any predispositions held 
by the trial judge" who properly submitted the case to the jury.91 Arguably, with a 
jury trial, the judge's evidentiary rulings and other matters of law are part of the 
record and are reviewable for any instances of actual bias.92 The better view is 
that a jury trial is no substitute for granting a motion to recuse.93 During a jury 
trial, a judge still exercises discretion about various matters and makes decisions 
that may influence the verdict returned by the jury.94 
Canon 3[ ] of the Judicial Code applies to every judge in every case; it does not 
set a lower standard for a judge sitting without a jury than for a judge sitting 
with a jury, but a single standard . . . . [T]he argument implies that where the 
judge is not the trier-of-fact, his role is somewhat less than decisive to the 
outcome of the proceeding.95 
A third set of cases suggests that a violation of the appearance of partiality 
standard does not automatically require a new trial or a reversal without 
additional proof confirming actual bias or prejudice.96 Actual prejudice is "shown 
when there exists a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been more 
90. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 391 (N.H. 1992) (all orders traceable to 
disqualified judge vacated); State v. Smith, 635 So.2d 512, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (sentencing of defendant by 
judge, who while a practitioner had stood in for counsel of record at arraignment, vacated). Cf. State ex rel. 
Thexton v. Killebrew, 25 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (judge's order setting aside his self-
disqualification is void). 
See also Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Conn. 1998) (where the court 
found that the judge's improper denial of a motion for disqualification also indicated that the trial court had 
improperly denied a motion for a mistrial, and thus the appellate court remanded the case for a new trial). 
91. Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946,960-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). Similarly, in Chapman v. State, 
694 A.2d 480, 482 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997), the trial judge offered to recuse if the defendant wanted a jury, 
stating that with a jury all he had to do was to rule on motions and give jury instructions. After giving defense 
counsel a chance to argue whether recusal was appropriate in a jury trial, the judge denied the motion when 
defense counsel replied in the negative. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion. 
92. See Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Center, 536 N.W.2d 666,671 (N.D. 1995). 
93. In Parenteau v. Jacobson, 586 N.E.2d 15, 18-19 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), the court suggested that a court's 
ruling on a motion to disqualify is irrelevant to when the trial might begin, given the need to find a different 
judge if the motion was granted. 
94. See Parenteau, 586 N.E.2d at 19 (vacating the judgment and remanding for new trial). 
95. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 479 A.2d 973, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984). In other cases, the reviewing court has found that some aspect of the proceeding precludes a reversal, 
despite the appearance of partiality. See, e.g.. Commonwealth v. Sharp, 683 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1996) (sheriff successfully sought and obtained search warrant from his judge-spouse; reviewing court refused 
to find that the appearance required "negation" of the warrant's validity, because the issuance of a warrant is 
subject to at least two levels of review). 
96. See, e.g., State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998); Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, 
Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374,386 (W. Va. 1995). 
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favorable for the [losing party] absent the trial judge's appearance of bias."97 The 
United States Supreme Court contributed significantly to the judicial reluctance 
to prescribe remedies each time an appearance of partiality occurs when it stated 
that "there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who 
inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance."98 
In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corporation?9 the Supreme Court 
held that a federal judge who was a university trustee should have recused 
himself from a proceeding in which the university had an interest. After 
identifying the ethical violation, the Court concentrated on whether the breach 
required that the judgment be vacated, or whether an erroneous denial of a motion 
to disqualify may be harmless. 
[I]n determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a[n ethical] 
violation... it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the 
particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other 
cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial 
process. We must continuously bear in mind that to perform its high function in 
the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." l0° 
Because the factors for appearance of partiality cases are more rigorous than 
typical harmless error analysis, they do not limit a court to a finding of actual 
prejudice in order to reverse.101 
97. 4/0/120, 973 P.2d at 979. 
98. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 864, quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Liljeberg Court applied its own 
standards to the facts summarily and concluded that: (1) a greater risk of unfairness existed if it upheld the 
judgment instead of having a different judge take a "fresh look" at the issues; neither party had shown special 
hardship by relying on the judgment; and (2) the delay was attributable to the trial judge's failure to recuse 
himself sua sponte. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. at 868-69. 
101. Courts have applied these principles to ex parte judicial conversations. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7)(a) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4) (1972). In In re WT.L, 
656 A.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the judge initiated an ex parte conversation with another juvenile about the 
juvenile defendant during an unrelated court proceeding involving the other juvenile. The appellate court ruled 
that the ethical violation was harmless. In Foster v. United States, 615 A.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1992), although the 
judge conducted an ex parte communication with the parole board regarding its sentencing recommendation in 
violation of Canon 3(A)(4), the appellate court found the error harmless. In both cases, the court examined the 
Liljeberg factors after making a finding of an ethical violation. The courts* respective adoption of a harmless 
error analysis is as instructive for what would constitute reversible- error, as it is for why both cases ruled the 
error to be harmless. As to the risk of injustice to the parties, the W.T.L. court stated that the risk is "negligible" 
when the communication elicits no prejudicial information about the party and arises in a proceeding in which 
the court considers a variety of sources of information in making its discretionary decision. In re W.T.L, 656 
A.2d at 1130. In Foster, the court downplayed the risk of injustice to the defendant when the relevant 
proceeding contains a highly discretionary issue. Foster, 615 A.2d at 220. Both appellate decisions evaluated 
the risk of injustice to others by relying on their prior admonitions to trial judges to avoid such ex parte 
communications. In re W.T.L, 656 A.2d at 1130; Foster, 615 A.2d at 221. Foster weakly noted that its facts 
differed from prior decisions in which the court already had scolded trial judges, and recommended that any 
future conversations occur on the record and in the presence of counsel. Foster, 615 A.2d at 221. The risk of 
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III. EXAMPLES OF THE APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY 
A. JUDICIAL REMARKS AND EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCE RULE 
The appearance of impropriety may emanate from judicial conduct or remarks 
directed at counsel, her client, a witness, or an issue102 in a proceeding. The case 
law resolves this type of disqualification motion as either a personal bias or 
prejudice103 issue or as an appearance of impropriety issue. Because of counsel's 
actions in the current or a prior case, the judge may question his or her own 
fairness to counsel's client.104 Or, the judge's reaction to a motion to disqualify 
may constitute the appearance itself. In Williams v. Reed,105 counsel in a child 
custody and support case moved for the judge's recusal because the judge was 
about to become involved in a dissolution proceeding in which the judge's spouse 
was involved in a same-sex relationship and child custody would be an issue. 
Prior to the hearing on the motion, the judge questioned counsel about the source 
undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process again was dismissed as "insignificant" in the 
absence of evidence of judicial bias or prejudice to the defendants. In re W.T.L, 656 A.2d at 1130; Foster, 615 
A.2dat222. 
By contrast, State v. Salazar held that disqualification was required due to the appearance of partiality, 
thereby rejecting the harmless error analysis in a case where counsel for one of the parties began to represent the 
judge's former secretary in a wrongful termination claim against the judge. 898 P.2d 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
The reviewing court focused on the risk of injustice to the parties, finding that the judge had made several 
important rulings against the defendant one of which the court had already found to constitute reversible error. 
The court noted that the trial judge should not sit in any cases involving counsel as long as the secretary's claim 
progressed. 
See also Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Conn. 1998) (case remanded for 
new trial due to appearance of partiality; in easement matter judge made ex parte visit to property that was 
subject of dispute and engaged in conversation with resident); Tyson v. State, 622 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind. 1993) 
(appellate judge's spouse's conversation with appellate counsel created appearance of partiality, requiring 
judge's recusal). 
102. See, e.g., State ex rel. McCulloch v. Drumm, 984 S.W.2d 555, 557-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (judge 
indicated to parties that he had made up mind about validity of defense prior to retrial; appearance of 
impropriety); State v. Ray, 984 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (judge's oral and written statements 
suggested that he was interested in fact-finding mission; appearance of bias against prosecution); Jefferson-El v. 
State, 622 A.2d 737, 743 (Md. 1993) (judge criticized jury verdict, issued warrant for defendant's revocation, 
and made remarks preliminary to start of revocation proceedings showed appearance of impropriety); State ex 
rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692,698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (judge told parties that his own divorce case's 
disposition of marital property was an alternative he might consider if case went to trial; remanded for 
evidentiary hearing on appearances). 
103. See, e.g., Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1151 (Miss. 1998); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 
(Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Services, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 222,225 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). 
104. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 727 A.2d 254,256 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), where the court recused itself from all 
of counsel's cases because the judge did not approve of the way counsel "handled" himself. When the presiding 
judge ordered the trial judge to preside over one of counsel's cases, the appellate court reversed and remanded 
due to the appearance of partiality stemming from the judge's initial remarks and the subsequent unfairness of 
having a judge who had made such an admission nevertheless preside in counsel's case. 
See also Vaska v. State, 955 P.2d 943,946-7 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (case remanded for proof about whether 
the trial judge's law clerk engaged in conduct creating an appearance of partiality by revealing confidential 
memo to prosecutor). 
105. Williams v. Reed, 6 S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
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of and factual basis for the motion. The judge called counsel's client to the 
witness stand, denied her request to consult with her counsel, and threatened to 
hold her in contempt if she failed to follow his orders. Prior to denying the 
motion, the judge told counsel that he was personally insulted by the filing of 
such a baseless motion. In addition to finding that the judge should have recused 
because he effectively made his spouse a material witness,106 the court assessed 
whether the appearance of partiality also required recusal and constituted 
reversible error. The context of the record showed that: 
the trial judge went beyond merely possessing the view that the allegation was 
offensive, and he went beyond expressing his displeasure at the making of the 
allegation . . . . The feelings of personal insult the judge understandably 
possessed appear to have affected the way in which he conducted the hearing 
. . . to such a degree that a reasonable person would doubt the judge's 
impartiality.107 
Judicial frustration with a matter can lead to an appearance of partiality, 
perhaps depending on when the judge chooses to speak. In Cameron v. 
Cameron™* for example, the appellate court criticized the trial judge for 
expressing a preconceived view of a witness's credibility. The judge on several 
occasions stated that the defendant or counsel was attempting to perpetrate a 
fraud on the court and that the defendant had lied under oath in an earlier 
deposition. When the judge invited the defendant to testify, the judge held him in 
contempt after he gave his name and address. By contrast, after conclusion of the 
matter, reviewing courts are much more lenient about what a judge can say to a 
party without risking even an appearance problem. Neither an explanation for a 
particular sentence to protect society from people like the defendant nor a judicial 
admonition not to appear in the judge's courtroom again necessitates recusal.109 
The appearance of impropriety may require recusal when a judge's remarks 
about the parties or a litigation issue results from information discovered outside 
the judicial proceeding,110 because that opinion arises from an extrajudicial 
106. Id. at 921. See Mo. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 3D(l)(d)(iii) (1999) (requires disqualification when the 
judge knows that the judged spouse is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding). 
107. W///am5, 6 S.W.3d at 923. 
108. Cameron v. Cameron, 444 A.2d 915, 918-19 (Conn. 1982). In State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (Utah 
1998), the appellate court concluded that there was an appearance of partiality when the trial judge told the 
defendants that their case could be resolved quickly if they would simply waive their right to a jury trial and 
"just plead guilty." The appellate court ruled, however, that the appearance of partiality without a showing of 
bias was not reversible error. 
109. See, e.g., People v. Dumas, 739 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (defendant failed to show that 
judicial description of him as a marauder following sentencing showed appearance of impropriety); People v. 
Cline, 596 N.Y.S.2d 925,927 (App. 1993) (remarks that defendant should not appear before judge again years 
earlier does not preclude judge from sitting in current case). 
110. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (extrajudicial source doctrine applicable to 
appearance of partiality standard). 
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source. A judge's opinion based upon information heard during a current or even 
an earlier proceeding does not stem from an extrajudicial source and is generally 
not considered to be grounds for disqualification.111 Not all cases fit the general 
rule. In Jefferson-El v. State,112 following defendant's acquittal, the trial court on 
the record criticized the jury's decision as an "abomination" and the next day 
issued a warrant charging defendant with a probation violation. While there is not 
actual impropriety in the same judge hearing the probation revocation after 
presiding at the trial which resulted in the probation violation, it appeared from 
the judge's remarks that the "judge believed either that the [defendant] 
committed perjury or otherwise 'hoodwinked' the jury, escaping all punishment 
for the crime the judge believed he committed."113 To a reasonable person, the 
judge's remarks suggested that he was predisposed to revoke the defendant's 
probation whatever the circumstances.114 
HI. See Duncan v. State, 638 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994); State v. D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 913 
(Ohio 1993); City of Kansas City v. Willis, 697 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Dane 
Entertainment Services, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 222,225 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). 
112. Jefferson-El v. State, 622 A.2d 737 (Md. 1993). 
113. Id. at 742. See Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (after holding that trial 
judge committed reversible error in child custody dispute, he was disqualified from hearing on remand due to 
appearance of partiality; his remarks to media were inconsistent with his findings of fact and the appellate court 
perceived that it would be unreasonable for the judge to put his prior expressed views out of his mind). 
114. In State v. Emanuel, 768 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), following the defendant's theft conviction but 
prior to sentencing, the judge conducted an ex parte inquiry into the defendant's background. At the sentencing 
hearing, the judge stated that he had conducted the inquiry because the presentence report revealed nothing 
about why the defendant had left the employ of several attorneys. From his inquiry, he learned that the attorneys 
believed that the defendant had stolen from them. The judge noted on the record that he was not basing the 
sentence on what he had learned from the attorneys. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the 
case for resentencing before another judge due to the appearance of partiality. 
In Emanuel, the court relied upon two cases in which the judge had ex parte contact with murder victims' 
family members prior to sentencing and had received unrebutted information pertaining to the issues before the 
court. See Id. at 198, citing State v. Leslie, 666 P.2d 1072 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Valencia, 602 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 
1979). 
The Emanuel court also noted III American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 18-6.9, Judicial 
Restraint (2d ed. 1980): 
Although the sentencing court may appropriately take into consideration the defendant's admission of 
guilt or assistance given the prosecution in come circumstances, it is inappropriate for the court to 
take the initiative in seeking to obtain such a confession or to induce cooperation with the prosecution. 
Similarly, although it is desirable that the sentencing court request the parties and the probation officer 
to provide it with additional information where the sentencing record appears incomplete or 
potentially inaccurate, the court should not undertake its own investigation absent extraordinary 
circumstances or otherwise consider allegations of misconduct by the defendant not present in the 
sentencing record. 
Mat 201. 
By contrast, when a judge holds an ex parte communication with someone who is not a party or a witness to 
the events at issue and the conversation concerns a piece of property that is not at issue, a reasonable person 
would not find that the conversation created an appearance of partiality. See TSA International Ltd. v. Shimizu 
Corp., 990 P.2d 713,725 (Haw. 1999). 
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The commentary to the Code should be amended to reflect the following about 
judicial remarks: 
When an allegation is made that a judge's remarks require disqualification or 
discipline, the following are some of the factors which should be evaluated: (1) 
the content and timing of the remarks; (2) whether the remarks indicate 
prejudgment of a party, lawyer, witness, or an issue in the proceeding; (3) 
whether the remarks were made on the record during a proceeding; (4) whether 
the media published the remarks; and (5) whether the remarks were consistent 
with rulings made by the judge as part of the proceedings. 
The content of judicial remarks can indicate a harshness or kindness toward the 
listener that suggests at a minimum the appearance of partiality (rather than 
personal bias or prejudice). The timing of the remarks may establish whether the 
judge appears to have prejudged a person or issue, or whether the proceeding is 
complete. Finally, the ease or difficulty of proving an appearance of partiality 
may be affected by whether the remarks are part of an audio, video, or written 
record. A dispute about whether the judge in fact made a comment can obscure 
the issue of whether the statement if made constituted the appearance of 
partiality. 
B. PRESIDING OVER A PRIOR RELATED OR UNRELATED CASE 
As discussed, the extrajudicial source rule generally prevents disqualification 
when the judge has acquired information about a matter or a person.115 The 
appearance of partiality may arise not only when the judge presides over the same 
or a related case involving the same party,116 but even when the judge previously 
sat in unrelated proceedings. For example, in Pride v. Harris,111 the plaintiff in a 
115. The person about whom information is gathered does not have to be a party in either proceeding. For 
example, in State v. D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ohio 1993), a trial judge did not have to recuse himself 
from hearing a case that led to a murder conviction. One of the important prosecution witnesses leading to that 
conviction was also a witness who had testified at the co-defendant's trial over which the trial judge presided. 
The reviewing court found that even if the trial judge had formed an opinion of the witness's veracity based on 
the testimony at the first trial, that opinion did not disqualify the judge from presiding at the second trial. 
However, some cases hold that, if the record shows that the judge in a prior proceeding expressed an opinion 
about the facts in a later proceeding, recusal is necessary due to the judge's bias toward the defendant. See, e.g., 
People v. Gibson, 282 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Robinson, 310 N.E.2d 652 (111. 1974); In re 
George G., 494 A.2d 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
116. In sparsely populated areas with only one judge, a local defendant may believe that an appearance of 
partiality exists when he has been convicted, placed on probation, and now faces new charges as well as a 
revocation proceeding before the same judge. Courts reject the argument that an appearance of partiality 
requires disqualification from the second trial because the possibility of a future revocation proceeding 
somehow will affect the judge's rulings during the current trial. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 694 A.2d 480, 484 
(Md.Ct. Spec. App. 1997). 
117. Pride v. Harris, 882 R2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1994). See James v. People, 727 P.2d 850, 857 (Colo. 1986) 
(two weeks before defendant's criminal trial, judge had made findings in woman's custody case that defendant 
supplied drugs to her; no appearance of impropriety for judge to preside at defendant's sexual abuse trial 
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personal injury action unsuccessfully sought disqualification of the judge who 
had presided over plaintiff's child custody matter. Although the judge made 
negative findings about plaintiff's fitness as a parent, the court held that no 
appearance of partiality existed and noted that an unhappy litigant cannot remove 
a judge due to unfavorable rulings. 
Knowledge about a pending118 or past119 related proceeding usually does 
not prevent a judge from being impartial, primarily because of the presump-
tion of impartiality. One exception occurred in Perotti v. State,120 where the 
defendant's criminal case was assigned to the same judge who had presided 
over his juvenile waiver hearing. The appellate court held that an appearance 
of partiality prevented the trial judge from sentencing the defendant for 
murder. As in the juvenile hearing, the judge had relied upon erroneously 
compelled evidence, both to order him treated as an adult and to sentence him 
as an adult. The similarity of issues and the likelihood that the juvenile 
proceeding evidence was inadmissible in the adult case were persuasive that a 
fair-minded person would perceive an appearance of partiality for the judge to 
sentence the defendant. 
Despite the extrajudicial source rule, a judge should not sit in review of his or 
her own decision, even in the same matter. That principle, which promotes an 
effective, original evaluation of legal issues, is subject to two troubling 
exceptions which, grounded in the extrajudicial source rule, effectively consume 
it. First, courts recognize no appearance of partiality when judges determine the 
legal validity of an earlier arrest or search warrant issued or authorized by him or 
her.121 The rationale for this exception is twofold: (1) the judge obtained 
knowledge about the facts supportive of the warrant's issuance from prior 
proceedings in the same matter;122 and (2) in issuing the warrant the judge 
involving different woman; judge's findings in custody case did not reflect disposition or prejudgment of 
defendant's case). Arguably, the result should differ when the prior finding related to a person's-credibility. The 
judge's view about the person's veracity directly expresses an opinion about the party, even though the judge's 
information was acquired in a judicial proceeding. If much time has passed since the judge's expression, the 
judge may not recall it when the person from a past proceeding appears again in the judge's coun. For the person 
to remind the judge of the ruling by raising the issue in order to disqualify the judge may amount to seeking the 
judge's disfavor in order to obtain the judge's disqualification. 
118. See Farren v. Commonwealth, 516 S.E.2d 253, 256 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) O^dge knew of defendant's 
pending unreasonable refusal charge before trying DU1 charge; insufficient reason for recusal). 
119. See People v. Burch, 530 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (1988) (knowledge from joint pretrial proceedings and 
jury trial of accomplice does not create appearance of impropriety and recusal for defendant's bench trial); 
State v. Hoeber, 737 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (judge knew of prior DUI guilty plea when 
scheduled to hear probation revocation following additional DUI conviction; no plain error to refuse 
recusal). 
120. Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 329 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). 
121. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 741 So.2d 938, 942 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). See also People v. McCann, 626 
N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1995); Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Ky. 1994); Stokes v. State, 853 S.W.2d 
227,242 (Tex. Ct, App. 1993). 
122. See Gentry v. State, 886 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994). 
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decides merely whether the affidavit's information is sufficient for probable 
cause, without vouching for its veracity.123 
The second exception occurs when the judge is unaware that he or she is in fact 
reviewing a prior matter, especially if the nature of the later decision making 
involves none of the judge's rulings from the earlier proceeding. In Poorman v. 
Commonwealth,124 for example, although an appellate judge had presided at the 
defendant's probable cause and pretrial release hearings, counsel's failure to raise 
the issue until after the appellate oral argument and the fact that none of the 
judge's earlier rulings were being appealed produced a finding of no appearance 
of partiality. 
From the prior discussion, the Code commentary should be amended as 
follows: 
When an allegation is made that a judge is presiding over a prior related or 
unrelated case, as to require disqualification or discipline, some of the factors to 
be evaluated include: (1) the similarity of parties, witnesses, and issues in the 
proceedings; (2) whether rulings on similar issues from the prior case have 
been adjudged to be erroneous; (3) the amount of time between the prior 
proceeding and the instant case; and (4) whether the judge is reviewing the 
correctness of his or her own ruling, such as the correctness of the issuance of a 
search warrant, and, if so, whether the judge is aware that he or she is reviewing 
an earlier ruling. 
C. PRESIDING OVER CASE OF FORMER CLIENT OR 
FORMER CLIENT'S OPPONENT 
Can a judge preside over a former client's,125 or former client's opponent's, 
unrelated case, without raising the appearance of partiality? In criminal cases, 
courts generally refuse to find an appearance of partiality when a judge, while 
serving as a prosecuting attorney, had prosecuted the current defendant on an 
unrelated charge.126 The relevant analytical elements are whether there is a 
123. See State v. Monserrate, 479 S.E.2d 494, 501 (N.C.Ct.App. 1997). 
124. Poorman v. Commonwealth, 782 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Ky. 1989). 
125. The judge must be presiding over a former client's case. If the judge did not represent the person in the 
past, the problem does not arise. In Wall v. State, 573 N.E.2d 890, 894 (Ind. 1991), the homicide victim had 
consulted the judge-then-attorney about the theft of his vehicles. While advising him to contact his insurance 
carrier, the judge maintained that he did not represent him. The judge did not file any lawsuit on the man's 
behalf, never entered an appearance, never was paid, and did not send a bill. Based on the judge's statements in 
denying the motion to disqualify, the appellate court found no appearance of partiality. 
126. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 926 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Ark. 1996); Mitchell v. Class, 524 N.W.2d 860, 863 
(S.D. 1994); State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988); Commonwealth v. Danish, 459 A.2d 727, 
730-31 (Pa. 1983). 
See I I I . SUP. CT. R. 63c(l)(c) (automatically disqualifies for seven years a judge who represented a current 
party). 
In State v. Dominguez, 914 P.2d 141, 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), the court found no appearance of unfairness 
when the trial judge had both prosecuted the defendant in an unrelated case and defended him in another. 
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relationship127 between the two proceedings, the amount of time between the past 
prosecution and the instant case,128 and whether the past prosecution is relevant 
to the current case.129 
When the earlier case is civil in nature, additional factors become relevant. 
Besides the recency of the representation and the similarities of the cases, courts 
also look at the period of time and the number of cases in which the judge 
represented the person, as well as the compensation received by the now-judge 
for the representation. In Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholomew the judge 
represented one of the current parties in three separate cases as an estate 
representative four years before the current claim, and was compensated from 
estate funds. While the reviewing court found no abuse of discretion in denying 
the motion to recuse, "out of an abundance of caution it may have been better for 
the judge here to have recused."131 
Two Mississippi cases illustrate the appearance issue for civil litigators who 
become judges. The trial judge presided over several medical malpractice cases 
against a hospital for which he had served as general counsellor four years. In 
each of the cases, plaintiff's counsel and the primary plaintiff's expert were the 
same. The judge represented the hospital at a time when the hospital vigorously 
recruited one of the defendants. During the hearing on the motion to recuse, 
several exchanges between the judge and plaintiff's counsel reflected "great 
personal tension," which grew out of a previous case during which counsel had 
accused the judge of being racially biased. While the trial judge refused to recuse 
127. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
128. Compare Turner, 926 S.W.2d at 847 (more than ten years); Mitchell, 524 N.W.2d at 862-63 (fifteen 
years); Neeley, 748 R2d at 1093 (twenty years) with Goines v. State, 708 So.2d 656, 659 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998) (nearly six years; reversed due to error on disqualification issue); W.L v. State, 696 So.2d 457 (Ba. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1997) (about two years; disqualification ordered). 
129. Goines grafted an exception to the general rule. The appellate court granted a new trial for selling 
cocaine, because the trial judge had previously prosecuted the defendant in an unrelated drug case. The state had 
declared its intention to seek an enhanced sentence from the judge based upon consideration of "the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the previous conviction [the judge] had helped to obtain." Goines, 708 So.2d at 
659-60. Compare Cooper v. State, 879 S.W.2d 405 (Ark. 1994) (no bias or prejudice in having prosecutor who 
obtained two convictions preside at trial where the two convictions would be used for enhancement). 
130. Robin Farms, Inc. v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). In Edwards v. State, 694 N.E.2d 
701, 711 (Ind. 1998), the court listed relevant factors for determining whether a reasonable person would doubt 
the judge's partiality: the nature of the prior representation, the duration of the attorney-client relationship, the 
extent to which the prior representation might in some limited way be related to the current case, and the lapse of 
time between the prior representation and the appearance of the former client before the judge. The Edwards 
court applied these factors to three former clients. In each case the prior representation was in a proceeding 
completely unrelated to the case over which the judge presided. The judge presided in the cases one to five years 
after representing the parties as clients. 
131. Robin Farms, 989 S.W.2d at 250. See Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986) (reviewing 
court found no abuse of discretion in trial judge's denial of recusal motion when judge ten years earlier as 
county attorney had represented current party in two "routine" URESA proceedings); Chastain v. State, 521 
S.E.2d 657, 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (no appearance of partiality because judge or her firm had represented 
current trial witness in her divorce from defendant). 
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himself on the ground of inconvenience to the parties, the appellate court found 
an appearance of partiality, noting that inconvenience is an insufficient reason for 
failing to disqualify.132 
The foregoing discussion supports amendment of the Code commentary, as 
follows: 
When an allegation is made that a judge is presiding over the case of a prior 
client (or the case of a person who was the former client's adversary at the time 
of the representation) as to require disqualification or discipline, some of the 
factors to be evaluated include: (1) the relationship between the two proceed-
ings; (2) the amount of time between the past proceeding and the instant case; 
(3) whether the past proceeding is relevant to the current case; (4) the number 
of cases in which the judge represented the former client; and (5) the 
compensation received by the judge for the prior representation. 
D. PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ATTORNEYS, OTHER JUDGES, 
AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Because of a specific Code provision, a judge cannot hear a case handled 
personally by the judge133 or by the judge's former legal associate during their 
association.134 Moreover, the general appearance of impropriety standard is used 
132. Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898 (Miss. 1992); Davis v. Neshoba County General Hosp., 611 So.2d 904 
(Miss. 1992). 
133. See Rushing v. City of Georgiana, 361 So.2d 11, 12 (Ala. 1978) (prosecutor on homicide charge was 
sitting as judge in personal injury case arising from same transaction; disqualification required); State v. Smith, 
635 So.2d 512, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (judge represented defendant at arraignment; appearance of partiality; 
remanded for resentencing by different judge). 
134. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(b) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3(C)(1)(b) (1972). 
The commentary states that although a lawyer in a governmental agency does not ordinarily have an 
association with other lawyers employed by that agency within the meaning of these sections, a judge should 
recuse if his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) 
cmt. (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) cmt. (1972). See, e.g., State ex rel. Corbin v. 
Superior Court, 748 R2d 1184,1186 (Ariz. 1987) (appearance of partiality requires resentencing of defendant in 
case where judge was fellow prosecutor or prosecutor of record at time prosecution commenced); Small v. 
Commonwealth, 617 S.W.2d 61, 62-3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (as prosecutor, judge participated in plea bargaining 
of defendant's original sentence; disqualification required revocation hearing due to appearance of partiality). 
Cf. Disqualification of Knece, 688 N.E.2d 515, 516 (Ohio 1997) (judge who was prosecutor at time defendant 
was prosecuted not required to recuse from defendant's revocation proceeding; former deputy prosecuted 
criminal charge and represents prosecution in revocation case; judge denied any participation in defendant's 
prosecution and did not recall discussing case with former assistant prosecutors; no appearance of partiality). 
See also Marxe v. Marxe, 570 A.2d 44, 48 (N J. Super. Ct. 1989) (no appearance of partiality when judge's 
former law clerk is employed by firm representing party in matter before the judge, but is not working on instant 
case and did not work on instant matter as law clerk); Ward v. Ward, 895 R2d 749, 751 n.l (Okl. Ct. App. 1995) 
(paralegal in community was party in case before judge; no appearance of partiality because professional 
contact by bar and their staffs cannot be basis for disqualification; otherwise any lawyer or staff member who 
went to trial would need new judge); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) 
(current association between part-time trial commissioner and county attorney gives appearance of impropriety 
so that the former cannot issue search warrants because she is not perceived as a neutral and detached 
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to determine whether a judge is disqualified when a former law partner, associate 
or co-counsel of the judge began the current representation after the termination 
of the professional relation with the judge. 
Any decision regarding disqualification of a judge for prior contact with an attorney 
must be made with the understanding that judges often come to the bench after 
having had extensive contacts with the community and the legal profession . . . . A 
judge who arrives on the bench after years as a practicing attorney may have had 
countless co-counsel relationships. To require disqualification for a prior co-counsel 
association that is minimal and does not include a present financial interest or any 
other business or social relationship would place a burden on the judicial system that 
is in our opinion without justification.] 35 
The case law is well-settled about the elements that a reasonable person, 
knowing all the relevant facts, would consider in assessing the judge's 
impartiality. Therefore, a "totality of the circumstances" framework for amend-
ing the Code's commentary follows: 
When an allegation is made that a judge is presiding over the case in which a. 
former law partner, associate or co-counsel of the judge began the current 
representation after the termination of the professional relation with the judge, 
as to require disqualification or discipline, some of the factors to be evaluated 
include: (1) the nature and extent of the prior association;136 (2) the length of 
time since the association terminated;137 (3) whether the judge continues to 
benefit from the relationship;138 and (4) whether personal or social relation-
ships derived from the professional relationship.139 
magistrate); Annotation, 16 A.L.R.4th 550 (1982) (discussing judicial split on whether the head of an office such 
as a district attorney or an attorney general must be disqualified under these standards). 
135. Bonelli v. Bonelli, 570 A.2d 189, 193 (Conn. 1990). See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1524 (1987) (judge not required to recuse just because judge had been associated 
with counsel two years earlier; period of one or two years after terminating professional association appropriate, 
depending on closeness of relationship and continued contact). See also I I I , SUP. CT. R. 63c(l)(c) (for three 
years, automatically disqualifies a judge who was associated in private practice with counsel of record); State v. 
Mustafoski, 867 P.2d 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (applies statute disqualifying judge who prosecuted defendant 
less than two years before current case, regardless of connection between cases). 
136. In re Bias, 947 P.2d 1152,1156 (Utah 1997) (same law firm); Bonelli, 570 A.2d at 192 (judge's personal 
participation in prior case was limited and other attorneys actually managed the case; co-counsel relationship 
nominal, especially when co-counsel were representing interests of different clients); Kinard v. Kinard, 986 
S.W.2d 220,229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (office sharing); James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399,404-05 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995) (same law firm). 
137. In re Bias, 947 P.2d at 1156 (thirteen years since member of firm); Bonelliy 570 A.2d at 193 (fourteen 
months clearly sufficient to attenuate possible impropriety from co-counsel relationship); Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 
229 (eight years since office sharing ended); James, 656 N.E.2d at 405 (seven months not sufficient lapse, 
especially when Yellow Pages advertisement showed referee-judge and counsel associated in same law firm). 
138. In re Bias, 947 P.2d at 1156 (no financial interest in firm); Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 229 (all financial ties 
severed). 
139. In re Bias (no appearance of partiality); Bonelli (same); Kinard (same); James (appearance of partiality 
requires recusal). 
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A judge's attitude toward an attorney practicing in the judge's court may raise 
concerns about the appearance of partiality,140 especially when the attorney has 
held a position of trust with the court. In two Alabama cases,141 active members 
of the bar who served as guardians and conservators for their counties were 
charged in highly publicized cases with embezzlement and theft from those 
conservatorships and estates. Because reasonable persons would question the 
impartiality of the judges, whose trust the defendants were charged with 
breaching, the appellate court granted petitions for recusal of all the judges in the 
respective circuits. 
Allegations about the appearance of partiality due to the relationship between 
judges142 also produce motions to disqualify. In the relatively common situation 
where a case is remanded for resentencing, a litigant may attempt a challenge to 
the new sentencing judge, even though the record fails to indicate any special 
relationship between the judges. The theory for these unsuccessful motions to 
disqualify is that a judge in the same circuit or geographic area is incapable of 
putting aside feelings for the original sentencing judge to make an independent 
decision about a proper sentence.143 
Finally, although judges can engage in activities to improve the law, the legal 
system, and the administration of justice, if in doing so they do not cast doubt on 
their capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before them,144 
litigants have tried to use judges' organizational affiliations as the basis for a 
motion to disqualify. The leading case is State v. Knowlton145 where the 
defendant attempted to use the judge's membership on a Governor's Task Force 
for Children at Risk to remove the judge from his probation revocation hearing. 
The appellate court compared the task force's composition and its responsibilities 
with the treatment, probation, or punishment of child abusers like the defendant, 
and refused to find that the judge's participation equated to his acting as an 
140. In Consiglio v. Consiglio, 711 A.2d 765, 769 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), the trial judge granted counsel's 
motion to recuse in all pending matters handled by counsel. Less than three weeks later, the trial judge refused to 
recuse in another of counsel's cases because the chief judge had ordered him to preside. The appellate court 
reversed and ordered a new trial, stating that the "presiding judge does not have the power to tell a trial judge 
when he or she may or may not recuse himself or herself," and that any reasonable person "would question the 
trial judge's impartiality in hearing a case in which [counsel] represented one of the parties." 
141. Ex parte Bryant, 682 So.2d 39,41-42 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Price, 715 So.2d 856, 859 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1997). 
142. In Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226, 229-30 (Ky. 1995), at the time of defendant's drug trial 
charges were pending against him based upon the burglary of the home of a fellow trial judge's father. Denial of 
the defendant's motion to recuse, based upon the professional relationship between the judges, was upheld 
because no facts were presented to create even an appearance of bias. 
143. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Mo. 1996); State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 918 (Mo. 
1996). 
144. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4A(1) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4A (1972). 
145. State v. Knowlton, 854 P.2d 259 (Idaho 1993). 
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advocate against persons like the defendant.146 Unless the movant can prove that 
the agenda of an organization or committee is inconsistent with the duty to judge 
impartially, the judge's mere membership does not present an appearance of 
impartiality.147 
E. CLAIMS FILED AGAINST OR BY THE JUDGE 
Generally, litigants cannot eliminate judges they find to be unsatisfactory148 by 
filing or threatening149 to file judicial conduct complaints150 or separate 
lawsuits151 against those judges. Without proof of actual bias, the rationale for 
finding no appearance of partiality is that a litigant should not be permitted to 
"judge shop" by filing lawsuits against undesired judges. Conversely, a per se 
recusal rule might cause a lawyer to withhold a legitimate complaint or claim 
against a judge that could effectively preclude later appearance before the judge. 
No appearance of partiality exists when the litigant files a separate lawsuit after 
proceedings have begun, but a previous filing may raise the appearance.152 
In the opposite situation, a judge's report of perceived attorney misconduct 
also is insufficient to constitute an appearance of partiality so that the judge must 
be disqualified in any proceeding where the attorney is counsel of record. In order 
to maintain the integrity of the legal profession, when a judge receives 
146. 
A judge does not have an affirmative duty to withdraw from cases that merely tangentially relate to the 
judge's participation in an organization or committee. To hold otherwise would deprive the citizens of 
this state of the knowledge and experience that a judge brings to groups designed to improve the legal 
system. Similarly, our citizenry would also suffer if we discouraged our judiciary from heightening 
their knowledge and awareness of legal issues through participation in groups such as the Governor's 
Task Force for Children at Risk. 
State v. Knowlton, 854 P.2d at 263. In State v. Carlson, 833 R2d 463, 464-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), the court 
noted that a similar motion lacked support and confused "a judge's efforts to improve the legal system with an 
assumption of biased advocacy." See also State v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (judge's 
activities on domestic abuse coalition dealt with case management to improve general framework of system, 
and did not indicate personal bias about a particular case). 
147. See Yates v. Florida, 704 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Harris, J., concurring) (an 
example of a valid claim that the judge would not be fair in judging the movant would be if the agenda of the 
organization advocates stiffer penalties for cases like the defendant's). 
148. Ironically, the appearance of partiality may be created, not by filing a separate lawsuit or a motion to 
disqualify, but by the judge's reaction to a motion to disqualify in the same matter. See, e.g., Williams v. Reed, 6 
S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct App. 1999). 
149. Dunlop Tire Corp. v. Allen, 725 So.2d 960, 978 (Ala. 1998) (threatened lawsuit unrelated to instant case 
does not require recusal; no apparent partiality). 
150. Filing judicial conduct complaints against the judge provides no grounds for a judge's recusal. See, e.g., 
Ball v. Melsur Corp., 633 A.2d 705, 709-10 (Vt. 1993) (old ethics complaint not basis for recusal); Keene v. 
State, 938 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (contemporaneous complaint not grounds for recusal). 
151. See, e.g., Farm Credit of St. Paul v. Brakke, 512 N.W.2d 718,721-22 (N.D. 1994); Los v. Los, 595 A,2d 
381,385 (Del. 1991); Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946, 961 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
152. See People v. Lowenstein, 325 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Mich. 1982) Gudge must recuse when he or she was 
sued before the filing of current proceeding before him or her). 
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information or has actual knowledge that substantial likelihood exists that a 
lawyer has committed a violation'53 of the attorneys' rules of professional 
conduct, he or she has an ethical duty to report such misconduct. As with lawyers 
reporting judges, the finding of an appearance would discourage judges from 
reporting questionable behavior to the bar association for fear of the conse-
quences, e.g., motions to disqualify.154 
In deciding whether such a complaint or lawsuit presents a disqualifying 
appearance of partiality, several important factors that should be reflected in an 
amended Code commentary: (1) whether the litigant is using the claim as a means 
to judge shop or some other improper purpose; (2) the timing of the motion to 
recuse or the filing of the lawsuit; and (3) whether there was a legitimate reason 
for bringing the lawsuit.155 
F. JUDGE'S PERSONAL CONNECTION WITH PROCEEDINGS 
What should happen when the judge's attorney or an attorney for a party suing 
the judge appears before the judge as counsel of record? The 1990 Code amended 
the 1972 Code's ethical prohibition against personal bias or prejudice against a 
party to include a party's attorney as well.156 Therefore, in states that use the 1990 
Code, a motion to disqualify a judge because counsel of record is the judge's 
attorney or the attorney for someone suing the judge usually is based upon the 
personal bias provision. Litigants in states applying the 1972 Code must base 
such a motion on the residual appearance of impropriety provision. 
The key variables in evaluating the problem of the judge's attorney appearing 
before the judge are whether the attorney's representation is current or past, as 
well as whether the representation of the judge was in the judge's personal or 
153. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(3) (1972); M.ODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3D(2) (1990). See generally Leslie W. Abramson, The Judges Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other 
Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 752 (1997). 
154. See, e.g., 5-H Corporation v. Padovano, 708 So.2d 244, 248 (Fla. 1997); Joyner v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 740 A.2d 424 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). 
A judge's conduct also may raise an appearance problem when he or she acts in the dual capacity of judge and 
advocate. For example, in State v. Brown, 602 P.2d 478 (Ariz. 1979), after the judge noted consistencies between 
the defendant's trial testimony and information listed on the defendant's pretrial release questionnaire, he gave 
the court file to the prosecutor for review without contacting defense counsel. When the prosecutor did not act 
on the information, the judge contacted the prosecutor's supervisor to explain the inconsistencies and to 
investigate perjury charges against the defendant. After being advised by the judge of his actions, defense 
counsel's motion for a change of judge was denied. On appeal, the court had no difficulty with the judge's 
notification to the prosecutor about the perjury. However, the court held that going to the supervisor after finding 
the prosecutor's response inadequate was reversible error because he "gave the appearance of abandoning his 
role as a fair and impartial judge." Id. at 481. 
155. Farm Credit of St. Paul, 512 N. W.2d at 721 -22. 
156. Canon 3E(l)(a) of the 1990 Model Code declares that a judge must disqualify himself or herself from 
presiding in a proceeding when he or she "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party s 
lawyerr MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(a) (1990) (emphasis supplied). 
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official capacity. American Bar Association Informal Opinion 1477157 asked 
whether a "judge can properly sit in a case in which a litigant is represented by a 
lawyer who is a private practitioner and who is concurrently acting as attorney for 
the judge in unrelated litigation before another court, when the other litigation 
pertains to the judge's official position or conduct.5' The response was a general 
"no," regardless of whether the lawyer is charging the judge a fee and even if it is 
the lawyer's associates and not the lawyer who is representing the clients before 
the judge. "Only in unusual circumstances would a judge's impartiality not be 
subject to reasonable question when a lawyer appearing before the judge in 
behalf of a client is at the same time representing the judge in a personal matter or 
in a matter pertaining to the judge's official position or conduct."158 
The judicial decisions are not so clear about the necessity for recusal where 
there is a client-attorney relationship between a judge and an attorney who is 
concurrently practicing before the judge in an unrelated case. In the cases where 
courts have ordered or upheld disqualification, the primary concern is the 
appearance that the judge will be favorably disposed toward his or her own 
attorney's client due to his or her own relationship with the attorney. For 
example, in Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning,159 the appellate court issued a 
writ of prohibition for the disqualification of a judge who was presiding over a 
case in which one of the law firms was representing the judge and her spouse in a 
separate, unrelated matter. Because the attorney-client relationship involves 
confidentiality and financial arrangements, the court commented that it could not 
"perceive a trial judge considering argument from counsel on a case then going to 
counsel's office to discuss the judge's case."160 One court has described the 
pertinent issues in this context. 
Did the attorney represent the judge only as the nominal party in a mandamus 
proceeding? Is the lawyer representing the judge as a defendant in an action 
involving his office along with other public officeholders? Is the judge one of a 
large class of plaintiffs in a class action? Is a lawsuit which affects the judge's 
financial or personal well-being at issue? How close a relationship exists in 
truth rather than merely in theory between the judge and the lawyer? What is 
157. ABAComm. on Ethics and Profs Responsibility, Informal Op. 1477 (1981). 
158. Id. See In re Disqualification of Badger, 546 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 1989) (counsel in case pending before 
judge represented the judge in an official capacity in unrelated case; disqualification of judge mandated). The 
opinion noted that the "rule of necessity" may be applicable when a private lawyer with expertise in judicial 
salaries or pensions represents all judges. It also indicated that it was not addressing the case of a judge being 
represented in an official capacity by a state attorney general pursuant to the latter's legal duty to represent 
judges in matters concerning their judicial responsibilities. 
159. Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So.2d 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
160. Id. at 1130. See also Marcotte v. Gloeckner, 679 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (law firm 
represented both judge and insurer in case before judge in unrelated matters simultaneously; disqualification 
ordered due to appearances). 
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the attendant publicity that might affect the public's perception of impartial-
ity?161 
As another court observed, nearly every petition for extraordinary relief "has the 
unfortunate consequence of naming the judge as a party and the judge is obliged 
-to obtain personal counsel or leave his defense to one of the litigants appearing 
before him."162 
When the judge is either one of many public officials sued or one of a class of 
plaintiffs seeking official or private redress, the relationship likely lacks the same 
bond as when the attorney represents one party who happens to be a judge.163 
Because any representation of the judge can influence the judge's personal 
well-being, that factor is therefore neutral. Finally, the amount or nature of 
notoriety may affect how the reasonable person perceives the appearance of a 
judge's representation by an attorney appearing in the judge's court as counsel. 
If an attorney's representation of the judge is in the past, regardless of its 
purpose, some courts refuse to find an appearance of partiality in the absence of 
proof reflecting bias or prejudice.l ** 
In appraising the significance of past representation . . . the fact that it is past 
must be recognized. Thus, the appearance arising from the fact of past 
representation will ordinarily be much less disturbing than the appearance 
arising from concurrent representation. For it is more likely to appear to a 
reasonable person that the judge's conduct of the trial might not be impartial 
when one of the attorneys is, even as the trial is being held, representing the 
judge.165 
161. Lueg v. Lueg, 976 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1998). 
162. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 374, 387 n.10 (W. Va. 1995). See In re 
Union Pacific Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. 1998) (Hecht, J., concurring) ("the relationship 
between judge and lawyer is of less concern... when it involves no more than the lawyer's representation of the 
judge as a respondent in a mandamus proceeding"). 
Cf. In re Disqualification of Morgan, 657 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio 1990) (ju(*ge w a s represented in 
prohibition action by prosecutor; plaintiff's counsel filed amicus curiae brief on behalf of client; no ongoing 
attorney-client relationship between counsel and judge; disqualification denied); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. 
Co. of America, 774 P.2d 1003, 1023 (Nev. 1989) (attorney's appearance on behalf of amicus curiae does not 
constitute representation of a litigant before the judge when the attorney also represented judge on unrelated 
matter; no appearance of impropriety). 
163. See Narro Warehouse, Inc. v. Kelly, 530 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (free legal services 
provided to judge and other public officials by attorney who was counsel in condemnation case before judge did 
not amount to appearance of partiality); Reiily by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 479 
A.2d 973, 985 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (concurrently representing judge as one member of class does not require 
recusal). 
164. See, e.g., Sonner v. State, 930 R2d 707, 712 (Nev. 1996) (counsel had represented judge in unrelated 
matter involving dissatisfied litigant); Murphy v. Murphy, 461 S.E.2d 39,42 (S.C. 1995); McKeague v. Talbert, 
658 R2d 898, 905 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983) (counsel had represented corporation of which judge was minority 
shareholder; no reasonable person would question judge's impartiality). 
165. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 479 A.2d 973, 979 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984). 
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However, recusal seems appropriate when the attorney now appearing before the 
judge helped the judge avoid or attain a large monetary recovery. On the other 
hand, no disqualification would be necessary if the attorney who wrote the 
judge's estate plan ten years ago appears in the judge's court. 
Past representation of a trial judge in his or her official capacity is the least 
likely situation to arouse concerns about negative appearances, because the 
representation is complete and related to the judge's public duties. In Reilly by 
Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,{66 defense counsel 
unsuccessfully sought the judge's recusal because opposing counsel had repre-
sented the judge in a class action seeking increased compensation for all state 
trial judges. The court observed that "[w]ere we to hold that the trial judge should 
have recused himself only because as a member of the class he had been 
represented by [counsel], it would follow that no trial judge could preside in any 
case in which [counsel] appeared,"167 thus requiring application of the rule of 
necessity. 
If counsel in the case at bar also is counsel for the judge's opponent or has 
opposed the judge in an unrelated case, do the relevant factors for considering the 
appearance of partiality vary? Only the nature of the appearance has shifted: 
instead of an appearance that the judge favors his or her own attorney in the case 
at bar, it may appear that the judge disapproves of the adversary-attorney. As with 
the judge's own attorney, current opposition to the judge creates a more negative 
appearance for the reasonable person than when the adversary relationship is 
completed.168 
Additions to the Codes' Canon 3 black letter standards or commentary based 
on the foregoing discussion could produce the following language: 
Whenever the judge is presiding in a case in which his or her attorney, or an 
attorney opposing the judge in an unrelated case, the judge shall consider 
recusal, giving appropriate significance to the following factors: (1) whether 
the matter is current or complete; (2) whether the matter relates to the judge as a 
public official or a private citizen, and, if the former, whether the judge is a 
nominal party in a proceeding seeking an extraordinary relief such as 
mandamus; (3) whether the judge is one of a large group of named plaintiffs or 
defendants; and (4) whether the attorney has represented or opposed the judge 
more than once. 
166. id. 
167. Id. at 980. See Yorita v. Okumoto, 643 P.2d 820, 825 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (attorney previously 
appeared as special deputy attorney general to represent judge in negotiations with alleged contemnor after 
judge issued contempt citation; no appearance of partiality). 
168. Compare Ex parte Cotton, 638 So.2d 870, 872 (Ala. 1994) (counsel was past adversary of judge; no 
appearance of partiality) with State v. Salazar, 898 P.2d 982, 987 (Ariz, Ct. App. 1995) ("a lawyer's [current] 
representation of a party adverse to the judge suggests that the judge might disfavor that lawyer, to the detriment 
of his client;" reversible error). 
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Although the issue is not raised in the case law, the frequency of prior 
representation of or opposition to the judge is relevant to whether a reasonable 
person would believe that the judge appears to favor or disfavor the client 
represented by the attorney. 
Motions to disqualify judges may arise from more personal subjects than the 
identity of the judge's attorney. The most well-known example arose in People v. 
Hall,169 in which the judge, defense counsel, and the defendant were discussing 
counsel's representation when the defendant struck his lawyer with a chair and hit 
the judge with his fist. Defendant's motion to disqualify the judge was rejected at 
the trial level and on appeal of his death sentence. 
Judges are called upon to preside over the trial of onerous causes and persons. 
By definition, however, a trial judge is required to ignore provocations and 
pressures, whether public or from individuals... . [T]o hold that the law 
requires a substitution of judges under circumstances similar or comparable to 
those here would invite misconduct toward judges and lawyers, and a practice 
would develop that the grosser the misconduct the better the chances to avoid 
trial with an undesired judge or lawyer.170 
Threatening or assaulting the judge fails to immediately equate with a disqualifying 
appearance of partiality, because the offending party regulates when and how any threat 
or assault on the judge occurs, thereby controlling the existence, nature, and timing of 
any negative appearance. As a result, courts agree that a person should not derive any 
benefit, such as a judicial disqualification, from his or her own misconduct. 
If the judge shares some personal characteristic with some aspect of a pending case, 
would a reasonable person knowing the facts find a disqualifying appearance of 
partiality? For example, if the judge's relative had been murdered by a member of a 
racial minority, is the judge disqualified from presiding over any murder trial in which 
the defendant's race is the same as the judge's relative's murderer? The court in State v. 
Shabazz171 stated that any such perception "would be based on nothing but speculation, 
and not on any reasonable basis."172 Or, suppose the judge personally had been the 
victim of criminal behavior comparable to the conduct alleged in the defendant's case. 
169. People v. Hall, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (111. 1986). Other cases have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., 
State v. Bilal, 893 P.2d 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (defendant assaulted judge immediately after verdict; no 
recusal); State v. Prater, 583 So.2d 520, 527-28 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (no appearance of impropriety forjudge to 
sit in case after defendant sent threatening letters to judge during trial); People v. Page, 702 N.Y.S.2d 552,5555 
(Nassau County Ct. 2000) (judge's viewing of post-verdict courtroom disturbance by defendant does not require 
judge's disqualification from sentencing proceeding). 
170. Hall 499 N.E.2d at 1347. In People v. Hall 626 N.E.2d 131, 135 (111. 1993), the defendant again 
unsuccessfully challenged die judge he had assaulted, this time to prevent him from presiding over the 
postconviction proceeding. 
171. State v. Shabazz, 719 A.2d 440 (Conn. 1998). 
172. Id. at 452. Mandatory disclosure of a judge's prior experiences can go too far. The judge, for example, 
should not have to provide a de facto autobiography to the parties to give them an opportunity to match the 
judge's experiences with some aspect of the case at bar, in order to seek the judge's disqualification. 
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In State v. Mann,173 the court analogized the judge's situation as a child abuse victim to 
a challenge for cause directed at a juror, suggesting that the length of time since the 
judge's victimization, the similarity of the incidents, and the lack of familiarity with the 
current victim were relevant considerations for assessing an appearance of partiality. 
For these types of personal situations, new Code language forjudges should 
include the following: 
If a judge is presiding in a case in which the judge shares a characteristic or 
circumstance with a party or the proceeding, the judge shall consider recusal, 
giving appropriate significance to the following factors: (1) the judge's 
familiarity with the party or the proceeding; (2) the nature and similarity of the 
shared characteristic or circumstance; (3) the length of time since the origin of 
the shared characteristic or circumstance; and (4) the identity of the person who 
initiated the existence of the shared characteristic or circumstance. 
G. FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 
The Codes specifically prohibit a judge from presiding in a proceeding in 
which he or she has a current family relationship. The Codes presume that a judge 
is disqualified when the judge, the judge's spouse, a person within the third 
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of the last category of 
relations is: (1) a party to the proceeding; (2) an officer, director, or trustee of a 
party; (3) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (4) to have an interest known to 
the judge that could be substantially affected by the result of the proceeding; or 
(5) known by the judge to be a likely material witness in the case.174 Courts 
examine other factual scenarios under the appearance of partiality standard. 
173. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Iowa 1994) (judge was victim of child sex abuse, and allowed to 
sit in child kidnapping case). The analogy of evaluating some aspect of the judge's experience to a juror's 
challenge for cause would be most appropriate for a bench trial where the court is the fact finder. See In re 
Margaret Susan P., 733 A.2d 38, 42 (Vt. 1999) (judge's status as adoptive parent does not create appearance of 
partiality in case seeking information about adoption); Williams v. Reed, 6 S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) 
(counsel in child custody and support case where the concern was about custodial parent's same-sex 
relationship moved for judge's recusal because judge was about to become involved in dissolution proceeding 
in which the soon-to-be ex-spouse was involved in same-sex relationship and child custody would be an issue; 
appearance of partiality given fact that prior to the hearing on the motion, the judge questioned counsel about 
the source of and factual basis for the motion, judge called counsel's client to the witness stand, denied her 
request to consult with her counsel, and threatened to hold her in contempt if she failed to follow his orders); 
State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (judge told parties that his own 
divorce case's disposition of marital property was alternative he might consider if case went to trial; remanded 
for evidentiary hearing on appearances); Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 653 A.2d 706, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(record failed to support recusal of judge from stalking case when judge was victim of stalking). 
174. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(d)(i)-(iv) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3C(l)(d)(i)-(iv) (1972). The 1972 Code assumes more background knowledge by the reader when it 
simply states that "the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system." MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(3) (1972). The 1972 Code's commentary proceeds to describe a third degree 
relation as a "father, grandfather, uncle, brother, or niece's husband." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3C(3) cmt. (1972). In the 1990 Code, the third degree of relationship includes the above relatives, plus 
great-grandparents and great-grandchildren. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990). 
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Despite the perception that current Code standards exhaust the possibilities of 
disqualifying involvement of a judge's relative with a proceeding, additional fact 
patterns with appearance of partiality issues include: (1) the presence of relatives 
beyond the third degree of relationship to the judge or the judge's spouse;175 (2) 
any relative associated with counsel of record without being counsel of record;176 
(3) any relative as the victim of a crime; or (4) any relative as an employee or a 
shareholder in a party.177 In State u Logan™ the judge's son worked for the 
prosecutor's office but the son was not even remotely involved in prosecuting 
Logan. As a public servant, the son had neither a financial interest in the outcome 
of the case or even a disqualifying reputation interest that was sufficient to create 
an appearance of partiality. The court found it "unlikely that a reasonable person 
would believe that a judge's propensity to convict criminal defendants would 
increase because his son works as a prosecutor."179 Under the facts of that case, 
the court probably reached the correct conclusion. However, if the judge's child 
175. Relatives beyond the third degree of relationship to the judge may be emotionally, socially, and 
financially closer to the judge than "biological'* family. In Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. 
Authority, 479 A.2d 973 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), defense counsel's attempt to disqualify the trial judge failed. 
Counsel argued that the judge's step-nephew acted as counsel in the case under the specific provisions of the 
Code, but the court found that a step-nephew is not within the Code's third degree of relationship. The appellate 
court remanded the case to determine whether the step-nephew's participation the case, in combination with 
other factors required recusal under an appearance of partiality standard. Id. at 985. 
176. "The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is 
affiliated does not of itself disqualify the judge." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990); 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C cmt. (1972). 
177. While a party's employment of a judge's relative alone may not suggest that the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, other facts may be pertinent. For example, in the employment situation, the 
number of employees, the nature of the judge's relative's position, and whether the relative's employment area 
is involved in the case are relevant points. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 
Cal. App. 3d 97 (1985). Although the judge's experience with a strike was more personal than others, it was 
unknown how the spouse's experience would affect the judge's view of the facts presented at trial. The judge's 
spouse worked two days for an employer that filed a claim against a union arising from a strike occurring during 
the spouse's employment. Because there was no continuing association between the employer and the judge's 
spouse and the spouse was not involved in the events underlying the claim, a reasonable person could ask only if 
the spouse's two-day employ would cause the judge to favor either the employer or the union. The court denied 
mandamus relief because the union could not cite even one example of how the judge's first eight weeks of 
presiding in the case supported an inference of partiality. 
When a relative of the judge is associated with a party, can an appearance of partiality exist? In Buchanan v. 
Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892 (Miss. 1991), counsel sought to disqualify the judge because the judge's son-in-law 
was a dental student where the opposing party and five of her witnesses worked. The opposing party and the 
witnesses were all alleged to be in a position to help the son-in-law with residency applications. Because the ' 
trial judge denied the motion without a hearing, the motion was remanded for a hearing. 
178. State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 778 (Kan. 1984). 
179. Id. at 785. See State v. Harrell, 546 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Wis. 1996) (no duty forjudge to disqualify when 
spouse works in prosecutor's office, when spouse did not participate in or help prepare instant case); Trimble v. 
State, 871 S.W.2d 562, 566-67 (Ark. 1994) (although the appearance generated by employing the judge's son 
for the summer in prosecutor's office was "none too good," no disqualification). 
The Logan concurrence found it "preferable . . . for a trial judge to recuse himself from the trial of criminal 
cases or . . . to offer to do so on the record, when his son is an attorney on the staff of the local prosecutor" 
regardless of the size of the prosecutor's office. Logan, 689 P.2d at 785-85 (Miller, J., concurring). See also 
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had worked on the case, though not as counsel of record, reasonable people might 
view the judge as "pro-prosecution," i.e., less than disinterested, impartial, and 
independent because the judge's child would be affected by the case's outcome. 
Other cases have handled recusal issues when a relative works for a private law 
firm but is not counsel of record. For example, while a partner's possibility of 
financial gain, as well as goodwill and reputation provides a disqualifying 
"interest" necessitating judicial recusal, an associate attorney's employment 
without being counsel of record may fall short even of an appearance of 
partiality.180 Moreover: 
there are circumstances in which a lawyer-relative and the affiliated law firm 
may receive a sufficient nonpecuniary benefit to create an appearance of 
impropriety requiring disqualification. Courts addressing this issue generally 
identify the goodwill the firm reaps as the implicated nonpecuniary interest. . .. 
[C]ourts are concerned with situations where the law firm's reputation is 
enhanced by the decision of the judge-relative so that, over time, the firm and 
the lawyer-relative in question will benefit sufficiently to create an appearance 
of impropriety... . [T]he benefit to the lawyer in cases where goodwill and 
reputation are enhanced is much more removed. As such, . . . the case before 
the judge-relative must be one which will greatly affect the firm's reputation.l81 
Because crime victims are not regarded as parties, the appearance of partiality 
standard may be invoked when the judge's relative is the victim of a crime or is 
affiliated with a crime victim.182 A judge's relationship could cause the judge to 
be more sympathetic to the prosecution, to the extent the prosecution represented 
the victim's interest. In State v. Alderson,™3 the judge informed counsel before a 
Smith v. Beckman, 683 R2d 1214, 1216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (judge precluded from presiding in case because 
his spouse worked in the prosecutor's office; appearance of impropriety). 
180. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 391 (N.H. 1992) (trial judge's uncle was senior 
partner in firm representing the city; judge recused when opposing counsel raised issue; "appearance of 
partiality permeates the proceeding;" all orders of disqualified judge vacated); In re Moffett, 556 So.2d 723 
(Miss. 1990) (appearance of partiality when judge's brother was senior partner in law firm representing party). 
181. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 258 (Utah 1992). The court recognized further 
that: 
The simple model of an associate's drawing a fixed salary may not fit all law firms. To the degree that 
a significant proportion of the associate compensation depends on factors analogous to those used in 
fixing partner or shareholder compensation, similar ethical inquiries may be necessary... . Because 
nonpecuniary interests that might enhance a firm's goodwill will result in benefits only over time, an 
associate's lack of secure tenure with a firm, whether because of the probationary nature of an 
associate's status or because of significant interfirm movement of young lawyers, reduces the 
likelihood of long-term benefit such that disqualification is not necessary. 
See also Washington v. Montana Mining Properties, Inc., 795 R2d 460,464 (Mont. 1990) (by itself, the judge's 
son's legal internship with opposing law firm does not create appearance of impropriety; together with other 
factors, recusal necessary). 
182. See State v. Greene, 519 P.2d 651 (Kan. 1974) (when judge's second cousin is victim of robbery; no 
disqualification because cousin not within third degree of relationship). 
183. State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435 (Kan. 1996). 
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felony murder trial that the vehicle that the defendant had allegedly driven at the 
time of the shootings had belonged to his brother and had been stolen from his 
father's house. The reviewing court upheld the trial judge's decision not to recuse 
himself at trial after he learned that the defendant was not charged with theft of 
the vehicle and that no one from his family would be called to testify. However, it 
remanded the case for resentencing before another judge on the theory that a 
reasonable person with full knowledge of the facts would question the 
impartiality of a judge whose relative was a crime victim involving the defendant 
who was being sentenced. As in other cases, Alderson's subtle insinuation is that 
negative appearances matter only when the judge directly deals with the party, 
but not when the jury is the fact-finder. 
H. SOCIAL OR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
Upon assuming judicial office, a judge does not have to "withdraw from 
society and live an ascetic, antiseptic and socially sterile life."184 Because a judge 
does have a life off the bench, occasionally challenges are made to disqualify the 
judge based on those social or business relations. The Codes treat social dealings 
either as constituting the appearance of partiality or as personal bias or prejudice. 
In a small town, explicit acknowledgment by a judge that he or she knows all the 
parties as well as the attorneys is merely a recognition of reality and does not call 
the judge's impartiality into question.185 Recusal for social relationships could 
184. United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 100 (1985). This 
sentiment echoes the language of Canon XXXII from the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics: 
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that a judge should live in retirement or 
seclusion; it is desirable that, as far as reasonable attention to the completion of his work will permit, 
he continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that he should not discontinue his interest in or 
appearance at meetings of members of the bar. He should, however, in pending or prospective 
litigation before him be particularly careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the 
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in influencing his 
judicial conduct. 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS XXXII (1924). 
185. See Kalapp v. State, 729 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (judicial comments about knowing 
everyone in a small town does not equal an appearance of partiality). 
See also In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 654 (R.I. 1992) ("[t]o hold that mere acquaintanceship between the 
bench and bar requires recusal of the trial justice, particularly in a state the size of Rhode Island, would result in 
a collapse of the state's judicial system;" no evidence offered supporting appearance of impropriety); State v. 
Strayer, 750 P.2d 390, 396 (Kan. 1988) (judge's social acquaintance with prosecutor was no basis for 
disqualification; "in a rural judicial district, it is to be expected that the district judges will be well acquainted 
with the members of the bar, including the prosecutors;" no appearance of impropriety); State v. Whitlow, 988 
S.W.2d 121, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (appellate court discounted fact that judge had known theft victim's son 
since high school and was a college fraternity brother; it was concerned that victim's son had served on a 
committee which had nominated to the Governor the trial judge as a judge candidate; "[t]hat a judge knows 
every attorney practicing in his circuit is common, especially in circuits the size of Platte County. That judges 
know attorneys and even are members of the same organization do not, in themselves, create the appearance of 
impropriety"). 
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effectively disqualify the judge from presiding over any case involving a local 
party. Without judicial disclosure about social familiarity or business contact, 
suspicions about a judge in a more populous place will depend upon someone 
attaching an affidavit to a motion to disqualify about the judge's contact with a 
victim, a party, an attorney, a witness, or the relatives of any of them.186 The 
concern about appearances is that, as a result of the social or business contact, a 
reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would believe that the judge 
will accord different credibility to the testimony or statements of the person 
known to the judge. 
Social contact by the judge with a party or victim in a pending case can lead to 
claims of the appearance of partiality. They may involve the judge's incredulity 
that his or her friend could be charged with the crimes at issue, while others entail 
allegations of animosity between the judge and a party.187 Most appearance of 
partiality charges are unsuccessful, however. For example, in State u Wood,lss 
the defendant sought recusal of the trial judge because the judge, the victim, her 
family, the lead detective, and two of the lawyers in the firm appointed to 
186. 
There are countless factors that may cause some members of the community to think that a judge 
would be biased in favor of a litigant or counsel for a litigant, e.g., friendship, member of the same 
church or religious congregation, neighbors, former classmates or fraternity brothers. However, such 
allegations have been found legally insufficient when asserted in a motion for disqualification. 
MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. 1990). See Committee for Utility 
Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 718 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ark. 1986) (no appearance of impropriety forjudge to sit in 
case in which he had been a college roommate of a judge who opposed to appellant's lawyer in a political race). 
187. Compare In re Conduct of Jordan, 624 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Ore. 1981) (judge told counsel that he could 
not believe that the defendant had committed the acts charged; judge should have recused for appearance of 
partiality) with In re Hill, 8 S.W3d 578, 584 (Mo. 2000) (judge and mayor of small town had public dispute; 
judge ordered mayor's daughter and her boyfriend arrested for contempt, without bond, notice, or hearing; 
judge should have recused for, inter alia, appearance of partiality; removal from office) and Leombruno v. 
Leombruno, 540 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 (1989) (judge anc* party-husband lived near each other and had 
disagreements requiring police intervention; judge should have recused himself due to the "serious questions as 
to the relationship . . . which could easily be interpreted by some as affecting the Justice's impartiality")- See 
State v. Lee, 948 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (the judge declared a mistrial on the second day of trial 
after seeing defendant's father and realizing that he socialized with the defendant's uncle frequently and the 
father on occasion; the court upheld the mistrial declaration because the judge's familiarity with the family 
could lead others to question his impartiality if sentencing became necessary). 
One of the most egregious examples of an appearance of impropriety occurred when the judge was removed 
from office for becoming socially involved and living with a criminal defendant in her court, and keeping his 
court file without permission during which time some of his records disappeared. Mississippi Commission on 
Judicial Performance v. Milling, 651 So.2d 531 (Miss. 1995). The judge also obtained a fugitive warrant on 
behalf of the defendant and summarily dismissed it, and allowed him to drive her car on a suspended license. Id. 
at 538. 
See also In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 712 (Ind. 1998) (judge violated appearance of partiality when he 
presided over child support proceedings involving party while having ongoing sexual relationship with her and 
financially contributing to her support). 
188. State v. Wood, 967 P.2d 702, 708 (Idaho 1998). The motion to recuse also alleged that the judge saw the 
victim's father on a regular basis and that the judge had to rule on evidence about a purported church doctrine 
offered to impeach church members who claimed that they were unfamiliar with "blood atonement." 
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represent the defendant attended the same church. Without analysis, the court 
held that judges do not have a duty to recuse merely because the case collaterally 
relates to the judge's participation in the church.189 
Social contact between a judge and counsel for a party during the pendency 
of a case before the judge is discouraged. However, courts correctly refuse to 
promulgate per se rules that "every chance meeting or a public social 
discussion between judge and lawyer"190 requires judicial disqualification for 
the appearance of partiality. In order to prove a negative appearance of 
partiality, evidence of the duration of the encounter, the content of any 
conversation, the circumstances of the meeting, and the frequency of 
meetings are necessary elements of proof. As when the judge's counsel 
appears before the judge, publicity about the judge's extrajudicial contacts 
with litigation participants can lead a reviewing court to conclude that there 
is an appearance of impropriety when the facts alone did not suggest 
recusal.191 
Concerns about a judge's business dealings also may lead to motions to 
disqualify. A judge cannot sit in a case in which he or she owns controlling 
interest in a bank that sues to foreclose a lien against a real estate owner, because 
the Codes require recusal when a judge either has an interest relating to the 
subject matter of the litigation or the judge's interest in the bank could be 
substantially affected by the judge's decisions.192 Otherwise, judges ethically can 
hold and manage investments, including real estate, as long as such dealings do 
not reflect adversely on the judge's impartiality.193 Such an appearance of 
189. In State v. Ross, 914 R2d 11 (Haw. 1999), the trial judge refused to recuse from a criminal case on the 
grounds both that he monthly had sold fish to the store where the crime occurred and that he knew the store's 
president. Reversing the court of appeals, the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the acquaintance would not 
affect the judge's ability to preside. More important, the store was not a party, the trial would not affect the 
market price the judge received from the fish sales, and the judge's connections to the store were unrelated to the 
charged offense that concerned an individual victim. The court noted that "bad appearances alone do not require 
disqualification." Id at 20, quoting Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 
1994). However, in Volodkevich v. Volodkevich, 518 N.E.2d 1208 (Ohio 1988), the court found an appearance of 
impropriety in a divorce case where the judge as an attorney had modified the parties' wills, he and his spouse 
were social acquaintances with the parties, and that one counsel had represented him on one occasion and his 
son on another. 
190. Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 703 N.E.2d 1141, 1147 (Mass. 1998) (no appearance of 
impropriety when judge had social contact with lead counsel for party in restaurant owned by judge's spouse 
during pendency of trial). 
191. See, e.g., Washington v. Montana Mining Properties, Inc., 795 P.2d 460, 464 (Mont. 1990) (newspaper 
article about judge's social meeting with counsel in pending case contributed to "snowballing" of situation into 
an appearance of impropriety). 
192. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(c), 3E(l)(d)(iii) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CoNDUCTCanon 3C(l)(c), 3C(l)(d)(iii) (1972). 
193. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4D(l)-(2) (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5C(l)-(2) (1972); Matter of Means, 452 S.E.2d 696, 698-99 (W. Va. 1994) (judge reprimanded under 
Canon 5C(1) for continuing business dealings with attorney who appears before him). 
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partiality exists when the judge jointly owns property with an attorney who 
appears in the judge's court.194 
New Code language covering a judge's social or business dealings should 
include the following: 
When a judge presides in a proceeding in which the judge (or the judge's close 
relative) and an attorney, party, victim, or witness (or their close relative) have a 
social or business relationship or contact, the judge shall consider recusal, 
giving appropriate significance to the following factors: (1) the duration of the 
relationship or contact; (2) the content of any conversation during the 
relationship or contact; (3) the nature and circumstances of the relationship or 
contact; (4) the frequency of meetings or conversations; (5) the personal 
dependence of either on the relationship; (6) whether the relationship was 
connected with the subject matter of the proceeding; (7) in a business 
relationship, whether the judge receives preferential treatment not granted to 
others; (8) whether the relationship has been the subject of media publicity; and 
(9) statements attributable to the judge or any other person about the 
relationship. 
I. CAMPAIGNS AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
In states where voters elect their judges, candidates rely upon organizational 
and financial backing from lawyers and law firms to support their campaigns. Is 
the appearance of partiality present when a campaign supporter is counsel, a 
litigant, or a witness in the judge's court? Should the answer depend on whether 
the supporter is a campaign chairperson, or someone displaying a yard sign or a 
bumper sticker to show support for the judge? Is a different answer appropriate 
when the person in the judge's court opposes the judge's election?195 May judges 
appear to be conducting the proceedings in their courts improperly, with an 
approaching election in mind?196 
194. See In re Fiftieth District Court Judge, 483 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Mich. 1992) (when judge and law firm 
owned lot on which law firm's building is located, joint liability of judge and law firm gives appearance of 
impropriety; financial ties between judge and law firm required recusal without any showing of actual bias or 
prejudice). See generally Cynthia Gray, The Judge as Landlord, 23 VT. B. J. & L. DIG. 19 (June 1997) 
(discussing split in judicial ethics advisory opinions when attorney rents office space in building owned by 
judge). 
195. Without more, no appearance of partiality is raised by the presence of a future or past candidate-
opponent as counsel in a case assigned to the judge's court. See, e.g., In re Disqualification of Bumside, 657 
N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio 1992) (counsel had filed papers to be candidate opposing the judge; no indication that 
judge's continued participation in case could reasonably be questioned); Ex parte Grayson, 665 So.2d 986, 987 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (one of party's lawyers opposed judge in most recent election and lost; "lawyer who 
becomes candidate for the public office of judge accepts the risk that, if he loses, he may have to try cases in the 
court of his successful opponent;" no appearance of partiality). See also McFarland v. State, 707 So,2d.l66, 180 
(Miss. 1997) (merely because a judge hears an election case when the judge in the future may run for reelection 
does not alone give rise to appearance of partiality). 
196. For example, in Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. 1992), two murder convictions 
were reversed, in part because the judge insisted on a trial date just prior to election day. The court found that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2000] THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY 99 
It is not surprising that counsel file motions to recuse when adversary counsel 
supports the judge-candidate. Caleffe v. Vitale197 granted a petition for a writ of 
prohibition, after the trial judge denied the motion to disqualify in a post-
dissolution proceeding because the ex-spouse's lawyer was co-chair of the 
judge's reelection campaign. 'The fact that attorneys are generally encouraged to 
support candidates for judicial office and do so, has little to do with the propriety 
of an attorney practicing in a particular case before a judge with whom he or she 
has a specific and substantial political relationship."198 
Unlike Caleffe, in State u Carlson,199 defense counsel moved to disqualify one 
judge on the appellate panel because the prosecutor was the honorary co-chair of 
the judge's campaign. Because the prosecutor did not personally argue cases in 
the appellate court, but appeared through his deputy prosecutors, defendant's 
argument would disqualify the judge from hearing any case from the prosecutor's 
office.200 The court did observe that a legitimate issue would arise if the 
prosecutor personally argued the defendant's case. Also, the court recited several 
factors relevant to determining the appearance issue when a campaign chairper-
son is a prosecutor: (1) the prosecutor's specific role in the instant case; (2) the 
size of the prosecutor's jurisdiction; and (3) unusual circumstances like the 
publicity surrounding the case or controversy about the prosecutor's handling of 
201 
certain cases. 
The 1972 ABA Code warns judges against involvement in political activity, 
but acknowledges that elected judges cannot disassociate themselves completely 
from political organizations and campaign activities.202 The commentary to the 
1990 Code states: "Though not prohibited, campaign contributions of which a 
judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or others who appear before the judge . . . 
may be cause for disqualification."203 When a judicial campaign contributor 
u[i]t would not be unreasonable to argue that [the judge] stood to gain significant public favor by conducting a 
trial in which a guilty verdict was returned in this high-profile case, shortly before the November election." See 
Ex parte Adkins, 687 So.2d 155 (Ala. 1996) (transfer of postconviction petition to another judge ordered; 
election weeks away could have affected the way judge conducted trial). 
197. Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
198. Id. at 629. In addition, a letter from the counsel-campaign co-chair to the judge added to the appearance 
of a special relationship and substantiated the opposing party's fears about receiving a fair trial. In the letter, 
counsel asked for the judge's "judiciousness and wisdom" in seeking a different approach to contempt hearings. 
199. State v. Carlson, 833 R2d 463 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
200. Carlson, 833 P.2d at 465 n. 1. As to whether a reasonable person would perceive an appearance of 
impropriety, the court noted a "vast difference" between a trial judge's and an appellate judge's role regarding 
the possibility of a personal relationship such as a campaign chairperson influencing the judge. One judge 
cannot control a three-judge panel, and appellate courts address legal issues rather than their own exercise of 
discretion. Id. at 468. 
201. Id. at 468. 
202. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1) (1972). See Roe v. Mobile County Appointment 
Board, 676 So.2d 1206, 1232-33 (Ala. 1995) (Code section not authority for recusals of judge based upon f\ve 
hundred dollar contribution from judge to judicial candidates). 
203. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) cmt. (1990). 
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opposes them in a case before the judge, litigants seek the judge's disqualifica-
tion. Occasionally, the amount of a contribution will constitute the appearance of 
partiality, "placing the integrity of the judicial system in a subservient role to the 
political process."204 In Breakstone v. MacKenzie,205 the court held that a five 
hundred dollar contribution by counsel to the judge's spouse's judicial campaign 
was a legally sufficient basis to disqualify the judge from the case. "In the real 
world the facts . . . give the appearance of partiality, justifying a recusal, 
notwithstanding the judge's genuine ability to maintain neutrality."206 The 
Florida Supreme Court vacated the ruling that a five hundred dollar contribution 
disqualified the judge, but upheld the order disqualifying the judge under the 
specific facts of the case.207 However, generally, the motion is denied, not 
because of the absence of an appearance of partiality but because of the reality of 
conducting a judicial campaign.208 
It is not surprising that attorneys are the principal source of contributions in a 
judicial election. We judicially know that voter apathy is a continuing problem, 
especially injudicial races and particularly in contests for a seat on an appellate 
bench. A candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from 
nonlawyers must reconcile himself to staging a campaign on something less 
than a shoestring. If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing lawyer 
is involved as counsel; judges who have been elected would have to recuse 
themselves in perhaps a majority of the cases filed in their courts. Perhaps the 
next step would be to require a judge to recuse himself in any case in which one 
of the lawyers had refused to contribute or, worse still, had contributed to that 
judge's opponent.209 
Because some judges ignore the appearance of partiality concept when lawyers 
and parties appear before the judges they support financially, in 1998 the 
American Bar Association appointed an Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial 
Campaign Finance to review recommendations about election contributions that 
arose from a special Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions. To ensure 
204. Keane v. Andrews, 581 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla.1991) ($3,850 contribution from opposing law firm was 
17.5% of judge's campaign contributions; appearance of partiality). 
205. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So.2d 1164 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
206. Id. at 1173 (Ferguson, J., concurring). 
207. See MacKenzie v. Breakstone, 565 So.2d 1332 (Ha. 1990). 
208. See, e.g., Roe v. Mobile County Appointment Board, 676 So.2d 1206,1232 (Ala. 1995) (no appearance 
of partiality for three appellate judges to donate to fellow judge's campaign); MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain 
Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Ha. 1990) (allegation that counsel or litigant has made legal $500 campaign 
contribution to trial judge or trial judge's spouse not legally sufficient ground for recusal; no appearance of 
partiality); Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (contribution was solicited by judge; 
contribution was small; contributing lawyer was not lead attorney; no abuse of discretion in denial of recusal 
motion). 
209. Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). See Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political 
Candidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1992); Stuart Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges From Cases 
Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449,465-66 (1988). 
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the judicial independence of an elected judiciary, the 1999 ABA House of 
Delegates adopted specific language in a new Canon 3(E)(1)(e), calling for 
mandatory disqualification when: 
(e) the judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party or a 
party's lawyer has within the previous [***] year[s] made aggregate* 
contributions to the judge's campaign in an amount that is greater than [ [ [[ 
[$ ***] for an individual or [$ ***] for an entity]] ] ] [[is reasonable and 
appropriate for an individual or an entity]].210 
Coupled with the 1990 Code's, narrowly-based judicial duty keep informed about 
various subjects,211 the new Code provision is incomplete. Under the 1990 Code, 
a judge does not have to keep informed about contributions. Is there not an 
appearance of partiality when a contribution satisfying the threshold amount and 
donor identity has been made, though the judge is unaware of the contribution or 
the specific amount and without a motion for recusal? If the judge or opposing 
counsel learns about the contribution after the proceedings have begun, should 
not the fact of a contribution be disclosed, even by the donor, at the beginning of a 
proceeding, to avoid squandering judicial resources? 
Presumably, contributions by a witness or on behalf of a party or a party's 
lawyer will still be addressed under the residual appearance of impropriety 
section. Each state can decide what period of time applies to lawyer or party 
contributions. Because contributions may take different forms and may be made 
directly or indirectly, the aggregate212 of contributions is important. The ABA 
Committee raised concerns that application of specific contribution limits could 
result in some lawyers or parties contributing to a judge's campaign "solely" in 
210. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(e) (1990), as amended. The provision was part of a 
group of recommendations, which dealt with judicial selection procedures, appointments by judges, 
disqualification, and campaign contribution limits, reporting and disclosure. The Committee also discussed 
public campaign financing of judicial elections and surplus campaign funds, concluding that they required 
further consideration. 
The Model Code amendment to Canon 3E is intended to be applicable whenever judges are subject to public 
election. Where specific dollar amounts determined by local circumstances are not used, the "reasonable and 
appropriate" language should be used. ABA Ad Hoc Comm. On Judicial Campaign Finance, Am. Bar Ass'n, 
Report to the House of Delegates (May 5,1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/adhoc599.html (visited 
March 6, 2000). The issue of specific dollar limits is "up to individual jurisdictions, recognizing that 
jurisdictions vary with respect to the cost of judicial campaigns, the size of the electorate, the availability of 
alternative sources such as public funding, and other factors." Conference Report: ABA Annual Meeting, 15 
LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 396,399 (August 18,1999). 
211. See supra note 53 and accompanying text 
212. "Aggregate:" 
denotes not only contributions in cash or in kind made directly to a candidate's committee or treasurer, 
but also, except in retention elections, all contributions made indirecdy with the understanding that 
they will be used to support the election of the candidate or to oppose the election of the candidate's 
opponent. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990), as amended. 
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order to disqualify the judge, but proposals considered by the Committee were 
rejected as "unworkable."213 
CONCLUSION 
The appearance of impropriety is the basis in most states for judicial 
disqualification and discipline when specific ethical standards are too narrow to 
include the facts under review. While this Article has noted reviewing courts' 
application and interpretation of this catch-all Code provision, the rule invites 
uncertainty or unwillingness by those who should apply it. To change that 
approach, this Article has offered specific ideas for improving the ABA Codes of 
Judicial Conduct or comparable state codes by supplementing current ethical 
norms. The common law of judicial disqualification shows that no set of rules can 
anticipate every disqualifying situation that may arise. Nevertheless, sufficient 
experience applying even the general appearance of impropriety rule can produce 
useful guidelines for the judges, counsel, and judicial conduct organizations 
responsible for Code interpretation and application. Reviewing ethical standards 
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and might reduce 
public impatience with the legal system's regulation of itself. 
213. ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Campaign Finance, Am. Bar Ass' n, Report to the House of Delegates 
(May 5,1999). 
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